The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV

subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of

$100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost

of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero.

Table 16-1

Quantity Price (per year)

0 $120

3,000 $100

6,000 $ 80

9,000 $ 60

12,000 $ 40

15,000 $ 20

18,000 $ 0

Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium?

a. 3,000

b. 6,000

c. 9,000

d. 12,000

What is the answer and how?