a. b. Consider the following game (player A plays row, player B plays column). U D...

 

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a. b. Consider the following game (player A plays row, player B plays column). U D i. L 1, -1 1, 1 Demonstrate whether there are any mixed strategy equilibria. (50%) ii. R 1, 1 -1, 1 In the Ultimatum Game, player splits $10 either equally (E) between the two players or takes $9 (U) and leaves $1 for the second player. The second player can now decide to accept (A) the suggested split, or reject (R) the game, such that both players get nothing. Plot the extensive form of this game. (20%) Solve the game in pure strategies. Which Nash Equilibria are subgame perfect? 5 (30%) a. b. Consider the following game (player A plays row, player B plays column). U D i. L 1, -1 1, 1 Demonstrate whether there are any mixed strategy equilibria. (50%) ii. R 1, 1 -1, 1 In the Ultimatum Game, player splits $10 either equally (E) between the two players or takes $9 (U) and leaves $1 for the second player. The second player can now decide to accept (A) the suggested split, or reject (R) the game, such that both players get nothing. Plot the extensive form of this game. (20%) Solve the game in pure strategies. Which Nash Equilibria are subgame perfect? 5 (30%)

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

a There are indeed mixed strategy equilibriums Player A could play L with a probability of 13 and R ... View the full answer