The story of WorldCom began in 1983 when businessmen Murray Waldron and William Rector sketched out...
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The story of WorldCom began in 1983 when businessmen Murray Waldron and William Rector sketched out a plan to create a long-distance telephone service provider on a napkin in a coffee shop in Hattiesburg, Miss. Their new company, Long Distance Discount Service (LDDS), began operating as a long distance reseller in 1984. Early investor Bernard Ebbers was named CEO the following year. Through acquisitions and mergers, LDDS grew quickly over the next 15 years. The company changed its name to WorldCom, achieved a worldwide presence, acquired telecommunications giant MCI, and eventually expanded beyond long distance service to offer the whole range of telecommunications services. WorldCom became the second-largest long-distance telephone company in America, and the firm seemed poised to become one of the largest telecommunications corporations in the world. Instead, it became the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history at the time and another name on a long list of those disgraced by the accounting scandals of the early 21st century. ACCOUNTING FRAUD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Unfortunately for thousands of employees and shareholders, World Com used questionable accounting practices and improperly recorded $3.8 billion in capital expenditures, which boosted cash flows and profit over all four quarters in 2001 as well as the first quarter of 2002. This disguised the firm's actual net losses for the five quarters because capital expenditures can be deducted over a longer period of time, whereas expenses must be subtracted from revenue immediately. World Com also spread out expenses by reducing the book value of assets from acquired companies and simultaneously increasing the value of goodwill. The company also ignored or undervalued accounts receivable owed to the acquired companies. These accounting practices made it appear as if World Com's financial situation was improving every quarter. As long as WorldCom continued to acquire new companies, accountants could adjust the values of assets and expenses. Internal investigations uncovered questionable accounting practices stretching as far back as 1999. Investors, unaware of the alleged fraud, continued to purchase the company's stock, which pushed the stock's price to $64 per share. Even before the improper accounting practices were disclosed, however, WorldCom was already in financial turmoil. Declining rates and revenues and an ambitious acquisition spree had pushed the company deeper in debt. The company also used the rising value of their stock to finance the purchase of other companies. However, it was the acquisition of these companies, especially MCI Communications, that made World Com stock so desirable to investors. In addition, World Com's CEO Bernard Ebbers received a controversial $408 million loan from the company's board of directors to cover margin calls on loans that were secured by company stock. The board loaned Ebbers the money at a rate below the national average and below their rate of return. In July 2001, WorldCom signed a credit agreement with multiple banks to borrow up to $2.65 billion and repay it within a year. According to the banks, WorldCom tapped the entire amount six weeks before the accounting irregularities were disclosed. The banks contend that if they had known WorldCom's true financial picture, they would not have extended the financing without demanding additional collateral. On June 28, 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directed WorldCom to disclose the facts underlying the events described in a June 25 press release regarding the company's intention to restate its 2001 and first quarter 2002 financial statements. The resulting document explained that CFO Scott Sullivan had prepared the financial statements for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. WorldCom's audit committee and Arthur Andersen, the firm's outside auditor, had held a meeting on February 6, 2002, to discuss the audit for the year ending in December 31, 2001. Arthur Andersen had assessed World Com's accounting practices to determine whether there were adequate controls to prevent material errors in the financial statements. Andersen attested that WorldCom's processes for line cost accruals and for capitalization of assets in property and equipment accounts were effective. In response to specific questions by the committee, Andersen had also indicated that its auditors had no disagreements with management and that it was comfortable with the accounting positions taken by WorldCom. PRESSURE TO COMMIT FRAUD The trouble leading to the fraud had actually begun two years prior. In 2000, a downturn in the telecommunications industry was impacting WorldCom's bottom line. Its line costs-fees paid for leasing parts of other companies' telephone networks-were increasing compared to revenue. A few of WorldCom's clients went bankrupt, meaning they could not pay their bills valued at $685 billion. In response, pressure was placed on company accountants Betty Vinson and Troy Normand to reduce expenses so the firm could meet Wall Street's expectations. However, the two accountants were not able to cut enough expenses to make up for the shortfall. Their boss Buford Yates claimed that CFO Scott Sullivan and company controller David Myers had asked them to take $828 million from a reserve account set aside for line costs and use it to pay expenses. This would violate accounting rules because reserves are supposed to be developed only if top managers believe there will be losses in that unit. Additionally, reserves should be developed for the unit in which the loss occurs, and there must be valid reasoning behind reducing the reserve account. Vinson at first refused to make the changes. However, under increased pressure from management and concerns over how they were going to support their families, the accountants eventually caved in to the pressure with the promise that this accounting manipulation would only occur one time. Normand and Vinson later felt guilty about their actions and planned to resign. However, CFO Scott Sullivan convinced them that the company needed them to get them through this crisis. He claimed the transfer was not illegal and he would accept full responsibility for it. Vinson began to rationalize her involvement and decided against quitting. Contrary to what they were initially told, the accountants were asked again and again to make accounting manipulations. Specifically, they were asked to make improper accounting transfers that involved shifting line costs from operating expense accounts into capital expenditure accounts. Because capital expenditures are subtracted from income over longer periods of time, the line expenses would not immediately detract from the bottom line when placed in capital expenditures. Vinson knew this was even worse than the $828 million transfer over which she had felt such guilt. However, she went along with the maneuver while she simultaneously looked for another job. The same issues occurred in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001, and the accountants continued to feel pressure to make the improper transfers to hide WorldCom's growing losses. When the group realized that they would have to continue making these improper accounting entries to keep the company afloat throughout 2002, they finally refused and told the controller that they would no longer make the transfers. However, by this time the Securities and Exchange Commission was suspicious that WorldCom seemed to be doing so well when other telecommunications firms were struggling. The activities had also caught the attention of the internal audit division at WorldCom. THE WHISTLEBLOWERS In March 2002 the head of WorldCom's wireless business visited Cynthia Cooper, the 38-year-old vice president of internal audit at World Com. He reported that he had placed $400 million aside to make up for customers who did not pay their bills. However, CFO Scott Sullivan had made the decision to take the $400 million and use it to boost World Com's income. While this did not necessarily violate accounting rules, Cooper thought it was strange because accounting rules dictated that when companies do not collect on debts, they are supposed to set up reserves to cover the debt and keep from making it look like the firm has more value than it really does. When Cooper approached Arthur Andersen about the issue, her concerns were ignored. Cooper, who felt it was her responsibility to inform the audit committee of what had occurred, took information about the reserves to the board. Sullivan would later phone her while she was at a hair salon and tell her not to discuss the matter with Andersen auditors, signaling a major red flag that something was amiss. Cooper decided she and her department would undertake a financial audit of the firm, which was beyond the scope of what her department usually did. In May 2002, manager Glyn Smith, who also worked under Cooper, was sent an email from WorldCom's Texas office. The email described how an employee at the Texas office had been fired for asking too many questions about the firm's capital expenditures. Smith forwarded the email to Cooper. The group began to suspect that money had been shifted from operating accounts into capital expenditure accounts to make World Com appear more profitable. After asking the director of financial planning about the issue, Cooper was told that the adjustment involved "prepaid capacity," a term Cooper and her team were not familiar with. Attempts to ask different managers what the term meant were evaded. That same month, auditor Gene Morse discovered an accounting entry for $500 million in computer expenses logged as a capital expenditure, without any documentation to substantiate Morse combed through WorldCom's computerized accounting systems. He discovered $2 billion that was supposedly spent on capital expenditures the year before but that had never been authorized for this type of spending. In June Cooper and Smith informed Sullivan that they planned to conduct an audit. Sullivan asked them to delay the audit until after the third quarter, another red flag that fraud was occurring. Cooper refused and approached the head of WorldCom's audit committee, who urged them to contact WorldCom's new external auditor KPMG (who had replaced Andersen after the Enron debacle). They also contacted Betty Vinson, who admitted she had had no support to justify making the capital-expense-accounting entries. The controller Mr. Myers also could not justify the entries. Reluctantly, Cooper and her team made the difficult decision to report the fraud. They reported the issue to the audit committee of the board. CFO Sullivan was told that he had a week to justify that the accounting activities in question were proper. When he failed to convince them, he was fired. WorldCom officially announced to the public that it had inflated profits by $3.8 billion over the last five quarters. The SEC responded by filing a civil suit against WorldCom. Times magazine would later award Cynthia Cooper the status of "Person of the Year" for 2002 and feature her on their cover issue, along with whistleblowers Sherron Watkins (Enron) and Coleen Rowley (FBI). However, she admits in her book Extraordinary Circumstances: The Journey of a Corporate Whistle-Blower that the decision to report the fraud was devastating and caused her severe anxiety and depression. WorldCom admitted to violating generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). It had been keeping two sets of books to hide its debt. Under Sullivan's direction, World Com was taking line costs and diverting them to capital accounts. This kept the costs from impacting the company's profitability and also directly violated accounting principles. After the scandal broke, World Com adjusted their earnings by $11 billion dollars for 1999-2002. Looking at all of WorldCom's financial activities for the period, experts estimate the total value of the accounting fraud at $79.5 billion. WORLDCOM FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY WorldCom did not have the cash needed to pay $7.7 billion in debt, and therefore, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July 21, 2002. In its bankruptcy filing, the firm listed $107 billion in assets and $41 billion in debt. WorldCom's bankruptcy filing allowed it to pay current employees, continue service to customers, retain possession of assets, and gain a little breathing room to reorganize. However, the telecom giant lost credibility along with the business of many large corporate and government clients, organizations that typically do not do business with companies in Chapter 11 proceedings. In 2001 WorldCom created a separate "tracking" stock for its declining MCI consumer long-distance business in the hopes of isolating MCI from WorldCom's Internet and international operations, which were seemingly stronger. WorldCom announced the elimination of the MCI tracking stock and suspended its dividend in May 2002 in the hopes of saving $284 million a year. The actual savings were just $71 million. The S&P 500 reduced WorldCom's long-term and short-term corporate credit rating to "junk" status on May 10, 2002, and NASDAQ de-listed WorldCom's stock on June 28, 2002, when the price dropped to $0.09. In March 2003, WorldCom announced that it would write down close to $80 billion in goodwill, write off $45 billion of goodwill as impaired, and adjust $39.2 billion of plant, property, and equipment accounts and $5.6 billion of other intangible assets to a value of about $10 billion. These figures joined a growing list of similar write-offs and write-downs as companies in the telecommunications, Internet, and high-tech industries admitted they overpaid for acquisitions during the tech boom of the 1990s. A detailed timeline of the events surrounding World Com's bankruptcy is contained in the appendix to this case. WHO IS TO BLAME? Naturally, no one stepped forward to shoulder the blame for WorldCom's accounting scandal, not its auditors, executives, board of directors, or analysts. As the primary outside auditor, Arthur Andersen (also under fire for alleged mismanagement of many other large scandal-plagued audits) was accused of failing to uncover the accounting irregularities. In its defense, Andersen claimed it could not have known about the improper accounting because former CFO Scott Sullivan never informed Andersen's auditors about the firm's questionable accounting practices. However, in WorldCom's statement to the SEC, the company claimed that Andersen did know about the accounting practices, had no disagreement with management, and that WorldCom had taken no accounting positions with which Andersen was not comfortable. Most people, including John Sidgmore, who replaced Bernard Ebbers as CEO for a time, blamed WorldCom's management for the company's woes. An initial observation by the independent investigator appointed by the bankruptcy court raised a "cause for substantial concern" regarding the board of directors and the independent auditors of WorldCom. The board has been accused of lax oversight. In particular, the board's compensation committee has been attacked for approving Bernard Ebber's generous compensation package. Several former finance and accounting executives pleaded guilty to securities-fraud charges, claiming they were directed by top managers to cover up WorldCom's worsening financial situation. In 2004, former WorldCom CEO Scott Sullivan, who worked above many of these employees, pleaded guilty to criminal charges. Because of a plea bargain, Sullivan was sentenced to only five years in prison in exchange for testifying against Bernard Ebbers. For her part in the fraud, Betty Vinson was sentenced to five months in prison and five months of house arrest. Bernard Ebbers stated that he did nothing fraudulent and had nothing to hide. WorldCom's lawyers have indicated that Ebbers did not know of the money shifted into the capital expenditure accounts. However, the Wall Street Journal reported that an internal World Com report identified an email and a voice mail that suggested otherwise. According to Scott Sullivan's testimony, Ebbers had intimidated him into overseeing the accounting fraud. In 2004, Ebbers was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and seven counts of fraud related to false filings with the SEC. Ebbers was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to 25 years in prison. He is currently serving his sentence in Louisiana and cannot be considered for parole until 2028 (when he will be 85 years old). 6 Additionally, Jack Grubman, a Wall Street analyst specializing in the telecommunications industry and who rated WorldCom stock highly, admitted he did so for too long. Grubman knew WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers socially and even provided World Com executives with special opportunities on investments. However, he insisted that he was unaware of the company's true financial condition. Grubman was later fired by Salomon Smith Barney because of accusations that he hyped telecommunications stocks, including Global Crossing and WorldCom, even after it became public that the stocks were poor investments. He was also fined $15 million by the SEC and banned from participating in securities exchanges in the future because of his conflicts of interest. Investors also won several class action lawsuits against the financial industry for activities related to the fall of World Com. These settlements included $1.64 billion from Citigroup for purchasers of WorldCom securities and $2 billion from JPMorgan Chase for selling $5 billion in World Com bonds. Arthur Andersen paid $65 million to investors to cover its liability in the collapse of WorldCom. Several executives including Sullivan and Ebbers also agreed to turn over substantial portions of their personal funds to employees and investors. REORGANIZATION AND ACQUISTION WorldCom took many steps toward reorganization, including securing $1.1 billion in loans and appointing Michael Capellas as chairman and CEO. WorldCom also tried to restore confidence in the company, including replacing the board members who failed to prevent the accounting scandal, firing many managers, reorganizing its finance and accounting functions, and making other changes designed to help correct past problems and prevent them from reoccurring. Additionally, the audit department staff was increased and reported directly to the audit committee of the company's new board. "We are working to create a new WorldCom," John Sidgmore said. "We have developed and implemented new systems, policies, and procedures." In 2003, the company renamed itself MCI and emerged from bankruptcy proceedings in 2004. However, this reorganization was not enough to restore consumer and investor confidence, and Verizon Communications acquired MCI in December 2005. The WorldCom accounting fraud changed the entire telecommunications industry. As part of their overvaluing strategy, World Com had also overestimated the rate of growth in Internet usage, and these estimates became the basis for many decisions made throughout the industry. AT&T, WorldCom/MCI's largest competitor, was also acquired. Over 300,000 telecommunications workers lost their jobs as the telecommunications industry struggled to stabilize. Many people have blamed the rising number of telecommunication company failures and scandals on neophytes who had no experience in the telecommunications industry. They tried to transform their startups into gigantic full-service providers like AT&T, but in an increasingly competitive industry, it was difficult for so many large companies to survive. QUESTIONS 1. 2. 3. What are some things that could have been done by WorldCom executives to prevent the accounting scandal? How could corporate ethics have played a part in this failure? What penalties have WorldCom executives paid for their part in the fiasco? Do you think these penalties are sufficient? The story of WorldCom began in 1983 when businessmen Murray Waldron and William Rector sketched out a plan to create a long-distance telephone service provider on a napkin in a coffee shop in Hattiesburg, Miss. Their new company, Long Distance Discount Service (LDDS), began operating as a long distance reseller in 1984. Early investor Bernard Ebbers was named CEO the following year. Through acquisitions and mergers, LDDS grew quickly over the next 15 years. The company changed its name to WorldCom, achieved a worldwide presence, acquired telecommunications giant MCI, and eventually expanded beyond long distance service to offer the whole range of telecommunications services. WorldCom became the second-largest long-distance telephone company in America, and the firm seemed poised to become one of the largest telecommunications corporations in the world. Instead, it became the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history at the time and another name on a long list of those disgraced by the accounting scandals of the early 21st century. ACCOUNTING FRAUD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Unfortunately for thousands of employees and shareholders, World Com used questionable accounting practices and improperly recorded $3.8 billion in capital expenditures, which boosted cash flows and profit over all four quarters in 2001 as well as the first quarter of 2002. This disguised the firm's actual net losses for the five quarters because capital expenditures can be deducted over a longer period of time, whereas expenses must be subtracted from revenue immediately. World Com also spread out expenses by reducing the book value of assets from acquired companies and simultaneously increasing the value of goodwill. The company also ignored or undervalued accounts receivable owed to the acquired companies. These accounting practices made it appear as if World Com's financial situation was improving every quarter. As long as WorldCom continued to acquire new companies, accountants could adjust the values of assets and expenses. Internal investigations uncovered questionable accounting practices stretching as far back as 1999. Investors, unaware of the alleged fraud, continued to purchase the company's stock, which pushed the stock's price to $64 per share. Even before the improper accounting practices were disclosed, however, WorldCom was already in financial turmoil. Declining rates and revenues and an ambitious acquisition spree had pushed the company deeper in debt. The company also used the rising value of their stock to finance the purchase of other companies. However, it was the acquisition of these companies, especially MCI Communications, that made World Com stock so desirable to investors. In addition, World Com's CEO Bernard Ebbers received a controversial $408 million loan from the company's board of directors to cover margin calls on loans that were secured by company stock. The board loaned Ebbers the money at a rate below the national average and below their rate of return. In July 2001, WorldCom signed a credit agreement with multiple banks to borrow up to $2.65 billion and repay it within a year. According to the banks, WorldCom tapped the entire amount six weeks before the accounting irregularities were disclosed. The banks contend that if they had known WorldCom's true financial picture, they would not have extended the financing without demanding additional collateral. On June 28, 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directed WorldCom to disclose the facts underlying the events described in a June 25 press release regarding the company's intention to restate its 2001 and first quarter 2002 financial statements. The resulting document explained that CFO Scott Sullivan had prepared the financial statements for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. WorldCom's audit committee and Arthur Andersen, the firm's outside auditor, had held a meeting on February 6, 2002, to discuss the audit for the year ending in December 31, 2001. Arthur Andersen had assessed World Com's accounting practices to determine whether there were adequate controls to prevent material errors in the financial statements. Andersen attested that WorldCom's processes for line cost accruals and for capitalization of assets in property and equipment accounts were effective. In response to specific questions by the committee, Andersen had also indicated that its auditors had no disagreements with management and that it was comfortable with the accounting positions taken by WorldCom. PRESSURE TO COMMIT FRAUD The trouble leading to the fraud had actually begun two years prior. In 2000, a downturn in the telecommunications industry was impacting WorldCom's bottom line. Its line costs-fees paid for leasing parts of other companies' telephone networks-were increasing compared to revenue. A few of WorldCom's clients went bankrupt, meaning they could not pay their bills valued at $685 billion. In response, pressure was placed on company accountants Betty Vinson and Troy Normand to reduce expenses so the firm could meet Wall Street's expectations. However, the two accountants were not able to cut enough expenses to make up for the shortfall. Their boss Buford Yates claimed that CFO Scott Sullivan and company controller David Myers had asked them to take $828 million from a reserve account set aside for line costs and use it to pay expenses. This would violate accounting rules because reserves are supposed to be developed only if top managers believe there will be losses in that unit. Additionally, reserves should be developed for the unit in which the loss occurs, and there must be valid reasoning behind reducing the reserve account. Vinson at first refused to make the changes. However, under increased pressure from management and concerns over how they were going to support their families, the accountants eventually caved in to the pressure with the promise that this accounting manipulation would only occur one time. Normand and Vinson later felt guilty about their actions and planned to resign. However, CFO Scott Sullivan convinced them that the company needed them to get them through this crisis. He claimed the transfer was not illegal and he would accept full responsibility for it. Vinson began to rationalize her involvement and decided against quitting. Contrary to what they were initially told, the accountants were asked again and again to make accounting manipulations. Specifically, they were asked to make improper accounting transfers that involved shifting line costs from operating expense accounts into capital expenditure accounts. Because capital expenditures are subtracted from income over longer periods of time, the line expenses would not immediately detract from the bottom line when placed in capital expenditures. Vinson knew this was even worse than the $828 million transfer over which she had felt such guilt. However, she went along with the maneuver while she simultaneously looked for another job. The same issues occurred in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001, and the accountants continued to feel pressure to make the improper transfers to hide WorldCom's growing losses. When the group realized that they would have to continue making these improper accounting entries to keep the company afloat throughout 2002, they finally refused and told the controller that they would no longer make the transfers. However, by this time the Securities and Exchange Commission was suspicious that WorldCom seemed to be doing so well when other telecommunications firms were struggling. The activities had also caught the attention of the internal audit division at WorldCom. THE WHISTLEBLOWERS In March 2002 the head of WorldCom's wireless business visited Cynthia Cooper, the 38-year-old vice president of internal audit at World Com. He reported that he had placed $400 million aside to make up for customers who did not pay their bills. However, CFO Scott Sullivan had made the decision to take the $400 million and use it to boost World Com's income. While this did not necessarily violate accounting rules, Cooper thought it was strange because accounting rules dictated that when companies do not collect on debts, they are supposed to set up reserves to cover the debt and keep from making it look like the firm has more value than it really does. When Cooper approached Arthur Andersen about the issue, her concerns were ignored. Cooper, who felt it was her responsibility to inform the audit committee of what had occurred, took information about the reserves to the board. Sullivan would later phone her while she was at a hair salon and tell her not to discuss the matter with Andersen auditors, signaling a major red flag that something was amiss. Cooper decided she and her department would undertake a financial audit of the firm, which was beyond the scope of what her department usually did. In May 2002, manager Glyn Smith, who also worked under Cooper, was sent an email from WorldCom's Texas office. The email described how an employee at the Texas office had been fired for asking too many questions about the firm's capital expenditures. Smith forwarded the email to Cooper. The group began to suspect that money had been shifted from operating accounts into capital expenditure accounts to make World Com appear more profitable. After asking the director of financial planning about the issue, Cooper was told that the adjustment involved "prepaid capacity," a term Cooper and her team were not familiar with. Attempts to ask different managers what the term meant were evaded. That same month, auditor Gene Morse discovered an accounting entry for $500 million in computer expenses logged as a capital expenditure, without any documentation to substantiate Morse combed through WorldCom's computerized accounting systems. He discovered $2 billion that was supposedly spent on capital expenditures the year before but that had never been authorized for this type of spending. In June Cooper and Smith informed Sullivan that they planned to conduct an audit. Sullivan asked them to delay the audit until after the third quarter, another red flag that fraud was occurring. Cooper refused and approached the head of WorldCom's audit committee, who urged them to contact WorldCom's new external auditor KPMG (who had replaced Andersen after the Enron debacle). They also contacted Betty Vinson, who admitted she had had no support to justify making the capital-expense-accounting entries. The controller Mr. Myers also could not justify the entries. Reluctantly, Cooper and her team made the difficult decision to report the fraud. They reported the issue to the audit committee of the board. CFO Sullivan was told that he had a week to justify that the accounting activities in question were proper. When he failed to convince them, he was fired. WorldCom officially announced to the public that it had inflated profits by $3.8 billion over the last five quarters. The SEC responded by filing a civil suit against WorldCom. Times magazine would later award Cynthia Cooper the status of "Person of the Year" for 2002 and feature her on their cover issue, along with whistleblowers Sherron Watkins (Enron) and Coleen Rowley (FBI). However, she admits in her book Extraordinary Circumstances: The Journey of a Corporate Whistle-Blower that the decision to report the fraud was devastating and caused her severe anxiety and depression. WorldCom admitted to violating generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). It had been keeping two sets of books to hide its debt. Under Sullivan's direction, World Com was taking line costs and diverting them to capital accounts. This kept the costs from impacting the company's profitability and also directly violated accounting principles. After the scandal broke, World Com adjusted their earnings by $11 billion dollars for 1999-2002. Looking at all of WorldCom's financial activities for the period, experts estimate the total value of the accounting fraud at $79.5 billion. WORLDCOM FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY WorldCom did not have the cash needed to pay $7.7 billion in debt, and therefore, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July 21, 2002. In its bankruptcy filing, the firm listed $107 billion in assets and $41 billion in debt. WorldCom's bankruptcy filing allowed it to pay current employees, continue service to customers, retain possession of assets, and gain a little breathing room to reorganize. However, the telecom giant lost credibility along with the business of many large corporate and government clients, organizations that typically do not do business with companies in Chapter 11 proceedings. In 2001 WorldCom created a separate "tracking" stock for its declining MCI consumer long-distance business in the hopes of isolating MCI from WorldCom's Internet and international operations, which were seemingly stronger. WorldCom announced the elimination of the MCI tracking stock and suspended its dividend in May 2002 in the hopes of saving $284 million a year. The actual savings were just $71 million. The S&P 500 reduced WorldCom's long-term and short-term corporate credit rating to "junk" status on May 10, 2002, and NASDAQ de-listed WorldCom's stock on June 28, 2002, when the price dropped to $0.09. In March 2003, WorldCom announced that it would write down close to $80 billion in goodwill, write off $45 billion of goodwill as impaired, and adjust $39.2 billion of plant, property, and equipment accounts and $5.6 billion of other intangible assets to a value of about $10 billion. These figures joined a growing list of similar write-offs and write-downs as companies in the telecommunications, Internet, and high-tech industries admitted they overpaid for acquisitions during the tech boom of the 1990s. A detailed timeline of the events surrounding World Com's bankruptcy is contained in the appendix to this case. WHO IS TO BLAME? Naturally, no one stepped forward to shoulder the blame for WorldCom's accounting scandal, not its auditors, executives, board of directors, or analysts. As the primary outside auditor, Arthur Andersen (also under fire for alleged mismanagement of many other large scandal-plagued audits) was accused of failing to uncover the accounting irregularities. In its defense, Andersen claimed it could not have known about the improper accounting because former CFO Scott Sullivan never informed Andersen's auditors about the firm's questionable accounting practices. However, in WorldCom's statement to the SEC, the company claimed that Andersen did know about the accounting practices, had no disagreement with management, and that WorldCom had taken no accounting positions with which Andersen was not comfortable. Most people, including John Sidgmore, who replaced Bernard Ebbers as CEO for a time, blamed WorldCom's management for the company's woes. An initial observation by the independent investigator appointed by the bankruptcy court raised a "cause for substantial concern" regarding the board of directors and the independent auditors of WorldCom. The board has been accused of lax oversight. In particular, the board's compensation committee has been attacked for approving Bernard Ebber's generous compensation package. Several former finance and accounting executives pleaded guilty to securities-fraud charges, claiming they were directed by top managers to cover up WorldCom's worsening financial situation. In 2004, former WorldCom CEO Scott Sullivan, who worked above many of these employees, pleaded guilty to criminal charges. Because of a plea bargain, Sullivan was sentenced to only five years in prison in exchange for testifying against Bernard Ebbers. For her part in the fraud, Betty Vinson was sentenced to five months in prison and five months of house arrest. Bernard Ebbers stated that he did nothing fraudulent and had nothing to hide. WorldCom's lawyers have indicated that Ebbers did not know of the money shifted into the capital expenditure accounts. However, the Wall Street Journal reported that an internal World Com report identified an email and a voice mail that suggested otherwise. According to Scott Sullivan's testimony, Ebbers had intimidated him into overseeing the accounting fraud. In 2004, Ebbers was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and seven counts of fraud related to false filings with the SEC. Ebbers was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to 25 years in prison. He is currently serving his sentence in Louisiana and cannot be considered for parole until 2028 (when he will be 85 years old). 6 Additionally, Jack Grubman, a Wall Street analyst specializing in the telecommunications industry and who rated WorldCom stock highly, admitted he did so for too long. Grubman knew WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers socially and even provided World Com executives with special opportunities on investments. However, he insisted that he was unaware of the company's true financial condition. Grubman was later fired by Salomon Smith Barney because of accusations that he hyped telecommunications stocks, including Global Crossing and WorldCom, even after it became public that the stocks were poor investments. He was also fined $15 million by the SEC and banned from participating in securities exchanges in the future because of his conflicts of interest. Investors also won several class action lawsuits against the financial industry for activities related to the fall of World Com. These settlements included $1.64 billion from Citigroup for purchasers of WorldCom securities and $2 billion from JPMorgan Chase for selling $5 billion in World Com bonds. Arthur Andersen paid $65 million to investors to cover its liability in the collapse of WorldCom. Several executives including Sullivan and Ebbers also agreed to turn over substantial portions of their personal funds to employees and investors. REORGANIZATION AND ACQUISTION WorldCom took many steps toward reorganization, including securing $1.1 billion in loans and appointing Michael Capellas as chairman and CEO. WorldCom also tried to restore confidence in the company, including replacing the board members who failed to prevent the accounting scandal, firing many managers, reorganizing its finance and accounting functions, and making other changes designed to help correct past problems and prevent them from reoccurring. Additionally, the audit department staff was increased and reported directly to the audit committee of the company's new board. "We are working to create a new WorldCom," John Sidgmore said. "We have developed and implemented new systems, policies, and procedures." In 2003, the company renamed itself MCI and emerged from bankruptcy proceedings in 2004. However, this reorganization was not enough to restore consumer and investor confidence, and Verizon Communications acquired MCI in December 2005. The WorldCom accounting fraud changed the entire telecommunications industry. As part of their overvaluing strategy, World Com had also overestimated the rate of growth in Internet usage, and these estimates became the basis for many decisions made throughout the industry. AT&T, WorldCom/MCI's largest competitor, was also acquired. Over 300,000 telecommunications workers lost their jobs as the telecommunications industry struggled to stabilize. Many people have blamed the rising number of telecommunication company failures and scandals on neophytes who had no experience in the telecommunications industry. They tried to transform their startups into gigantic full-service providers like AT&T, but in an increasingly competitive industry, it was difficult for so many large companies to survive. QUESTIONS 1. 2. 3. What are some things that could have been done by WorldCom executives to prevent the accounting scandal? How could corporate ethics have played a part in this failure? What penalties have WorldCom executives paid for their part in the fiasco? Do you think these penalties are sufficient?
Expert Answer:
Related Book For
Managing Human Resources
ISBN: 978-1285866390
17th edition
Authors: Scott A. Snell, George W. Bohlander, Shad S. Morris
Posted Date:
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What are the three main sets of factors that cause the supply and demand curves in the foreign exchange market to shift?
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Once a litigation matter is appealed, what are the four types of decisions that an appellate court may make? Explain each type.
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Selected financial data from the September 30 year-end statements of Kosanka Company are given below: Total assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,000,000 Long-term debt (12%...
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Identify a company and determine Four (4) important areas for improvement and explain how you might go about implementing these improvements.
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Creating an ERD (Entity Relationship Diagram) using the business rules provided to you by the Business Analyst working with the group that requires a database for tracking orders and components. The...
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A twice-differentiable function f is defined for all real numbers x. The derivative of the function f and its second derivative have the properties and various values of x, as indicated in the table....
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The following table sets out information in respect of Division X and Division Y. The cost of borrowing new finance is 10% per annum. Required Explain what view the managers of each division might...
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As technology becomes more sophisticated and complicated, which challenges presented by virtual teams might become more problematic?
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This extract describes changes in the UK company Bunzl, which announced at the start of 2005 that it would sell Filtrona, a business making cigarette filters, and concentrate on its outsourcing...
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Explain what is meant by the accrual of liabilities.
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How is the economic order quantity calculated.
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Last year, Brenda paid $4,000 in state income taxes, $6,000 in real estate taxes, $800 in state personal property taxes, and $2,500 in sales taxes. What is her maximum deduction for taxes on her...
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1. What are some current issues facing Saudi Arabia? What is the climate for doing business in Saudi Arabia today? 2. Is it legal for Auger's firm to make a payment of $100,000 to help ensure this...
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Name some companies with whom you have done business. Then discuss how you view their employer brands. Would you want to work for them or not? How might these firms improve their employer brands?
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1. Why isn't having the greatest amount of technical expertise the key to being a good supervisor at Google? 2. Does Google's research on the performance of its managers surprise you? Why or why not?...
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Three types of evaluation meetings are described in this chapter. a. What different skills are required for each? What reactions can one expect from using these different skills? b. How can a manager...
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You have just been telephoned by the chief accountant of a listed company client, Randerston plc, to tell you that there has been a computer breakdown and that some parts of the data concerning...
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Consider the following situations: (a) Assume that you are a partner in a two partner practice with total practice income of 250 000. One of your clients (a private limited company with a turnover of...
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You have been asked by your audit partner to be senior in charge of the audit of a small public limited company. Unbeknown to the partner, you hold 1000 of the 100 000 shares in the company. Do you...
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