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GAME Z Player B B1 B2 A1 7, 13 15, 10 A2 3, 8 9, 16 Player A A3 5, 8 4, 7 In Game Z (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously. Which of the following is true? Player B has a dominant strategy O Neither player has a dominant strategy O Both players have dominant strategies O Player A has a dominant strategySuppose the following game: Flayer 2 nice mean nice 30, 50 20, 20 Player 1 mean 90, 20 30, 30 Which of the following is true? () There is no Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies, there is only one Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. () There is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, there is only one Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies. () Both players play "mean\" with a 70% chance, and "nice\" with a 30% chance. () Both players play "nice" with a 70% chance, and \"mean\" with a 30% chance