Two individuals work on projects. Individual 1 expends effort e, and Individual 1 expends effort ez. These effort levels result in payoffs: 1(e1,ez) = ae + beg + dejez - cel u2( e1, e2) = aez + ben - sees The parameters, a, b, c and d are positive with c > d. (a) Find the best response functions for each of the individuals and plot them on a graph. These have the form en = by(ez) and ez = be(e), giving en as a function of ez and ez as a function of e1- (b) Find the Nash equilibrium levels, e; and e; of e, and ez. (e) The socially optimal levels, (21,e2) of en and ez maximize U(e1, e2) = 1 (e1, e2) + u2(e1, e2). Find the socially optimal levels, er and ez. (d) Show that e;