Question: Two players are bargaining over a three period bargaining model as discussed in class with player 1 making offers in rounds 1 and 3. Player

Two players are bargaining over a three period bargaining model as discussed in class with player 1 making offers in rounds 1 and 3. Player 2 makes an offer in round 2 only. Each player has a common discount factor delta. The two players are bargaining to split $20. They have three time periods available to them for their bargaining game. At the end of round 3, if no agreement has been reached then player 1 receives $2 and player 2 receives $1 and the rest of the money is destroyed. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in the finite horizon model in which the game ends after period 3.

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