We consider a model where citizens simultaneously choose whether to protest (P), or stay home (H). We will assume there are an infinite number of players, with each person represented by a point along the unit interval [0, 1]. We will assume that the players differ in their dedication to the cause and that this dedication is indexed by i [0, 1]. Thus Player i, with i near zero is not very dedicated, while a Player i with i close to 1 is highly dedicated. The payoff to each player depends on their individual choice and also on the fraction of citizens who choose to protest, x. The payoffs are as follows. - If Player i stays home (H), then the payoff is (H, x) = 4x 2 This payoff represents the benefits (or costs) that a non-participating citizen receives, based on the fraction of participants. If x > 1/2, then the government responds with concessions that benefit all citizens. If x