$.$

While the Thomases admitted that arranging preauthorization was ultimately their responsibility, they claimed that they boarded the

medivac flight based on Dr$.$ Archer's representation that someone else would arrange for the preauthorization requirements. Although

Dr$.$ Archer ultimately did write to KIC and ANMC to explain her decision to have Rachel transported to Seattle, she did not do so until

more than six months later.

When the hospital and Dr$.$ Archer would not pay the balances for which the Thomases were billed, the Thomases sued under a

number of theories, including promissory estoppel. That claim was based on Dr$.$ Archer's alleged promise to contact KIC and ANMC to

ensure coverage of the expenses related to Rachel's transfer to Swedish Medical Center and treatment there.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital and Dr$.$ Archer. The Thomases appealed.

Maassen, Justice C$.$ It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment On The

; $.$ :

The Thomases argue $...$ that the superior court erred by rejecting Thomases$$ Promissory Estoppel Claim.

promissory estoppel as a basis for enforcement of Dr$.$ Archer$$s The Thomases $...$ argue that the superior court erred when it re$-$

alleged promise to the Thomases. jected their claim that $[$i$]$fthe parties did not create a binding con$-$

tract, their agreement is nevertheless enforceable by the doctrine

x $*$ x of promissory estoppel.$$ They argue that Dr$.$ Archer$$s allegedpromise induced them to leave the hospital immediately with$-$

out their insurer$$s preauthorization, that this was a foreseeable

response to the promise, that because they left the hospital

without preauthorization they incurred substantial medical ex$-$

penses, and that the interest of justice is served by enforcing

Dr$.$ Archer$$s promise. They argue that, at a minimum, a jury

should have decided this claim.

$$The doctrine of promissory estoppel allows the enforcement

of contract$-$like promises despite a technical defect or defense

that would otherwise make the promise unenforceable.$[$Kie

rnan

v$.$ Creech, $268$ P$\mathrm{.}3$d $312,315($Alaska $2012).]$

Promissory estoppel has these elements: $1)[$t$]$he action

induced amounts to a substantial change of position; $2)$ it was

either actually foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by the promi$-$

sor; $3)$ an actual promise was made and itself induced the action

or forbearance in reliance thereon; and $4)$ enforcement is neces$-$

sary in the interest of justice.$[$Simpson v$.$ Murkowski, $129$ P$\mathrm{.}3$d

$435,440($Alaska $2006)($quoting Zeman y$.$ Lufthansa German Air$-$

lines, $699$ P$\mathrm{.}2$d $1274,1284($Alaska $1985)).]$ The superior court,

relying primarily on Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. vy$.$ City of Valdez,

$[282$ P$\mathrm{.}3$d $359($Alaska $2012),]$ held that Dr$.$ Archer$$s $$alleged

promise $[$was$]$ not $$definitive$,$clear$,$ or $$precise$$ enough to con$-$

stitute an $$actual promise.$$ The court discussed what it perceived

to ve $$the lack of clarity in the alleged oral promises and the

lack of unequivocal acceptance,$$ noting $[$Steven$$s$]$ signature on

the Acknowledgment of Financial Responsibility and $[$Rachel$$s$]$

deposition testimony that $...$ she would have taken the flight to

Swedish even if it was not covered.$$ The