Will you please help me solve these economics problems so I can gain a better understanding of the concepts and teach myself how to solve them?

#2 ASSIGNMENT 5 7ECON 2. A group of 7 pirates has 100 gold coins to distribute among themselves, according to the following rules. There is a xed sequence of players P1, P2, . . .137. In round 1, P1 makes a proposal (i.e.1 a vector of 7 numbers that add up to [DD], and all pirates sequentially vote Yes or No [in the same sequence, starting with P1). If at least half of the voters votes Y, the proposal is implemented and the game ends. Otherwise1 the proposer is thrown overboard, and the game proceeds among the remaining pirates, with P2 taking the place of the proposer, and so on. Ears}; pirate's payoff is equal to the number of gold coins he receives, and values being thrown overboard at 71000. Assume the foliowing about voting. Each pirate votes for a proposal if and only if his payoff in the proposal is at least as large as his continuation payoff in the subgarne that follows a rejection of the proposal.2 Characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game. 2Tbis assumption is meant to exclude miscoordination equilibria (e.g., a majority would prefer the proposal to pass, but everyone expects the proposal to fail and votes against it, which results in no voter being able to change the outcome of the election). Again, you do not need to consider such miscoordination equilibria because of this assumption. Note that there is also a tiebreaking assumption here: Voters who are indifferent between passage and failure of the proposal vote Yes