Would like step by step solutions to these two questions (see attached picture)

Thank you!

1) Consider the following extensive form game of coordination. Firms 1 and 2 must choose between technologies A and B. Firm 1 prefers technology A while firm 2 prefers technology B, but the firms obtain value from coordination. The following extensive form represents the game: A1 2,1 Firm 2 Firm 1 A B1 0,0 A2 -0,0 B B2 1,2 Firm 2 Note that this game is not simultaneous. a) Find all the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of this game b) Which outcomes satisfy the criterion of backward induction? c) Before Firm 2 makes its move, it sees a press release from firm 1 saying that it believes that the industry will converge to technology A. Would such a statement change the outcome of the game? 2) An industry consists of three firms with identical total cost functions C(q) = 18q + q2. Market demand is Q (P) = 150 - P. a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity, price and profits for this industry. b) Suppose a monopolist controlled the three firms. What would its cost function be? c) What would be this monopolist's quantity, price and profits