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Microeconomics Theory And Applications With Calculus 5th Global Edition Jeffrey Perloff - Solutions
1.4.2 Determine the Stackelberg equilibrium with one leader firm and two follower firms if the market demand curve is linear and each firm faces a con stant marginal cost, m, and no fixed cost. M
1. *4.1 Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 200- 5Q Each firm has a marginal cost of $20 per unit.a. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium?b. What is the Stackelberg equilibrium when Firm 1 moves first? M
1. * 3.19 An incumbent firm, Firm 1, faces a potential entrant, Firm 2, that has a lower marginal cost. The market demand curve is p = 120- q1- q2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $20, while Firm 2’s is $10.a. What are the Nash-Cournot equilibrium price, quantities, and profits without
1. 3.18 In a market, duopoly firms produce differentiated products. The inverse demand function for Firm 1 is p1 = 104- 10q1- 2q2. The inverse demand function for Firm 2 is p2 = 42- 2q2- q1. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of mc = 6. What are the Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities and
1. * 3.17 To examine the trade-off between efficiency and mar ket power from a merger, consider a market with two firms that sell identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 1, and Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 2. The market demand is Q = 15- p.a. Solve for the Nash-Cournot
1. 3.16 How would the Nash-Cournot equilibrium change in the airline example if United’s marginal cost were$100 and American’s were $200? (Hint: See Solved Problem 14.1.) M
1. 3.15 In 2015, Spirit reported that its “average cost per available seat mile excluding special items and fuel”was 5.7¢ compared to 8.5¢ for Southwest. Assuming that Spirit and Southwest compete on a single route, use a graph to show that their equilibrium quantities differ. (Hint: See
1. 3.14 Graph the best-response curve of the second firm in Solved Problem 14.1 if its marginal cost is m and if it is m + x. Add the first firm’s best-response curve and show how the Nash-Cournot equilibrium changes as its marginal cost increases.
1. 3.13 A duopoly faces an inverse market demand func tion of p = 120- Q. Firm 1 has a constant mar ginal cost of 20. Firm 2’s constant marginal cost is 40. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price in (a) a collusive equilibrium or(b) a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. (Hint: See
1. * 3.12 Why does differentiating its product allow an oli gopoly to charge a higher price?
1. * 3.11 The viatical settlement industry enables terminally ill consumers, typically HIV patients, to borrow against equity in their existing life insurance con tracts to finance their consumption and medical expenses. The introduction and dissemination of effective anti-HIV medication in 1996
1. 3.10 Using Table 14.2 and other information from the chapter, show how the deadweight loss varies in the airline market as the number of firms increases from one to three. M
1. 3.9 Consider the Cournot model with n firms. The inverse linear market demand function is p =a- bQ. Each of the n identical firms has the same cost function C(q) = Aqi + 1 2Bq2 i , where a 7 A. In terms of n, what is each firm’s Nash equilibrium output and profit and the equilibrium price? As
1. 3.8 When EasyJet exited the Gdansk to London, route in 2008, ticket prices of the two airlines, Wizz Air and Ryanair, still operating the route, drastically increased. Assuming airline ticket prices reflect the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, is it possible that Easy Jet’s exit from the route was
1. 3.7 Suppose there are n firms selling a homogeneous product at a constant marginal cost, m = 50, in a Cournot market. The inverse market demand curve is p = 200- 2Q, where Q = nq. What is the output of each firm, and the market quantity and price when the number of firms is 1, 2, 5, 14, and
1. *3.6 Your college is considering renting space in the student union to one or two commercial textbook stores. The rent the college can charge per square foot of space depends on the profit (before rent) of the firms and hence on the number of firms. Which number of stores is better for the
1. *3.5 In a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, each of the n firms faces a constant marginal cost m, the inverse market demand function is p =a- bQ, and the govern ment assesses a specific tax of τ per unit. What is the incidence of this tax on consumers? M
1. 3.4 From June 2017 to June 2018, the price of jet fuel jumped 33%.a. Based on a general Cournot model, use calculus to show how much a marginal change in the mar ginal cost, m, affects the equilibrium price.b. In 2018, fuel cost was about 23% of airlines’costs. Calculate how much a one-third
1. 3.3 According to Robert Guy Matthews, “Fixed Costs Chafe at Steel Mills,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2009, stainless steel manufacturers were increasing prices even though the market demand curve had shifted to the left. In a letter to its customers, one of these companies announced that
1. 3.2 In the initial Cournot oligopoly equilibrium, both firms have constant marginal costs, m, and no fixed costs, and the market has a barrier to entry. Use Exercises 559 calculus to show what happens to the best-response function of firms if both firms now face a fixed cost of F. M
1. *3.1 What is the duopoly Nash-Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q = 500- 10p and each firm’s marginal cost is 5¢ per unit? M
1. 2.7 In a market in which there are a larger number of firms, government may be less reluctant to prevent firms from merging. Do you agree with this view?3. Cournot Oligopoly
1. 2.6 In May 2016, the European Union officially blocked the merger of British telecom companies Three U.K., owned by CK Hutchison, and O2, owned by Telefónica. The reason given was that the resulting reduction in the number of network owning operators from four to three would lead to less choice
1.2.5 In 2013, a federal judge ruled that Apple colluded with five major U.S. publishers to artificially drive up the prices of e-books (which could be read on Apple’s iPad). Apple collects a 30% commission on the price of a book from the publisher. Why would Apple want to help publishers raise
1. 2.4 Firms have an incentive to form cartels in which they collude in setting prices or quantities to increase profits. Examples of cartels, some being government sanctioned, vary among countries and over time. They are numerous and include markets for agricultural products, industrial products,
1. 2.3 The European Union fined Sotheby’s auction house more than €20 million for operating a price-fixing cartel with Christie’s auction house (see “The Art of Price Fixing” in MyLab Economics, Chapter Resources, Chapter 14). The two auction houses were jointly setting the commission
1. *2.2 A market has an inverse demand curve p = 100- 2Q and four firms, each of which has a constant mar ginal cost of MC = 20. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same out put level, how much does each firm
1. 2.1 Many retail stores offer to match or beat the price offered by a rival store. Explain why firms that belong to a cartel might make this offer.
1.1. 1 Which market structure best describes (a) car man ufacturing, (b) restaurants in a city, (c) farms that grow soybeans, and (d) electricity distribution in a city? Why?2. Cartels
1. 6.2 Derive the mixed-strategy equilibrium if both Intel and AMD act simultaneously in the game in the Challenge Solution. What is the expected profit of each firm? (Hint: See Solved Problems 13.1 and 13.2 and the Challenge Solution.)
1. 6.1 In the game between Intel and AMD in the Challenge Solution, suppose that each firm earns a profit of 9 if both firms advertise. What is the new subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome? Show in a game tree.
1. 5.2 A prisoners’ dilemma game is played for a fixed number of periods. The fully rational solution is for each player to defect in each period. However, in experiments with students, players often cooperate for a significant number of periods if the total num ber of periods is fairly large
1. 5.1 Draw a game tree that represents the ultimatum game in which the proposer is a first mover who decides how much to offer a responder and the responder then decides to accept or reject the offer. The total amount available is $50 if agreement is reached, but both players get nothing if the
1. 4.3 Charity events often use silent auctions. A donated item or event, such as a meal with a movie star (Colin Firth and Scarlett Johansson in 2008) or a former president (Bill Clinton in 2013) or Warren Buffett (in 2018), is put up for bid. In a silent auction, bidders write down bids and
1. 4.2 At the end of performances of his Broadway play Cyrano de Bergerac, Kevin Kline, who starred as Cyrano, the cavalier poet with a huge nose, auctioned his prosthetic proboscis, which he and his co-star, Jennifer Garner, autographed to benefit Broadway Cares in its fight against AIDS. They
1. 4.1 To try to maximize her commission, a real estate agent decides to sell a property in a very active market using a second-price sealed-bid auction. The market price of comparable properties that have sold recently is €400,000. Suppose that three bidders— Aron, Ela, and Mila—value the
1. 3.14 Salgado (2008) found that AMD’s cost of manu facturing computer chips was about 12% higher than Intel’s cost because AMD had less learning by doing (Chapter 7), as it had produced fewer units.The more an incumbent firm produces in the first period, the lower its marginal cost in the
1. 3.13 David received a parking ticket but feels he did not deserve it! He can either pay it or go to court to contest it. In making his decision, he considers the amount of the ticket (worth 1 point), the time and effort required to contest it (worth 2 points), and how he feels about paying it
1.3.12 Due to learning by doing (Chapter 7), the more that an incumbent firm produces in the first period, the lower its marginal cost in the second period. If a potential entrant expects the incumbent to produce a large quantity in the second period, it does not enter. Draw a game tree to
1. * 3.11 Before entry, the incumbent earns a monopoly profit of πm = $10 (million). If entry occurs, the incumbent and entrant each earn the duopoly profit,πd = $3. Suppose that the incumbent can induce the government to require all firms to install pollution control devices that cost each firm
1. * 3.10 Suppose that an incumbent can commit to produc ing a large quantity of output before the potential entrant decides whether to enter. The incumbent chooses whether to commit to produce a small quantity or a large quantity. The rival then decides whether to enter. If the incumbent commits
1. *3.9 A monopoly manufacturing plant currently uses many workers to pack its product into boxes. It can replace these workers with an expensive set of robotic arms. Although the robotic arms raise the monopoly’s fixed cost substantially, they lower its marginal cost because it no longer has to
1. 3.8 Levi Strauss and Wrangler are planning new-generation jeans and must decide on the colors for their products.The possible colors are white, black, and violet. The payoff to each firm depends on the color it chooses and the color chosen by its rival, as the profit matrix shows:Levi Strauss
1. 3.7 A criminal wants the contents of a safe and is threat ening the owner, the only person who knows the code, to open the safe. “I will kill you if you don’t open the safe, and let you live if you do.” Should the information holder believe the threat and open the safe? The table shows the
1. 3.4 A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano’s and Giardino’s. Normally both restau rants prosper with no advertising. Romano’s could take some of Giardino’s customers by running radio ads and Giardino’s could do the same thing. The one-month profit matrix (showing
1.3.3 Suppose there is no subsidy, and the airlines from Exercise 1.8 make their entry decisions sequentially.How does the Nash equilibrium change depending on which airlines enters first?
1. 3.6 Two firms operate in a market. Solve for the Stackel berg subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for this duo poly given the following game tree. Is the joint-profit maximizing outcome the outcome of this game?Leader Sets Output Firm 1 Follower Sets Output 57 76 Firm 2 57 76 114 Profits(p1,
1. 3.5 In Solved Problem 13.2, suppose that Mimi can move first. What are the equilibria, and why? Now repeat your analysis if Jeff can move first.
1. 3.2 How does your analysis change if the government imposes a lump-sum franchise tax of 40 on each firm (that is, the payoffs in the matrix are all reduced by 40). Explain how your analysis would change if the firms have an additional option of shutting down and avoiding the lump-sum tax rather
1. 3.1 Suppose Akemi, Bulga, and Chen are the only peo ple interested in buying Peach Blossom Spring, the splashed-ink-and-color masterpiece painted by one of China's most popular artists, Zhang Daqian, in 1982. The hanging scroll is being sold through a second-price sealed-bid auction. Suppose
1.2.3 You and your best friend swear that if either of you reveals the other person’s secrets, that person will never speak to you again. How is this scenario like the repeated games described in this chapter? Dis cuss the circumstances under which this oath will result in neither of you
1.2.2 Jagtar and Ravi both grow mangoes, which they sell in the same local market. They are deciding whether to pick 5 baskets worth of mangoes or 10 baskets, and have the following profit matrix:Jagtar 5 1 5Ravi 11 122 16 24 17 14 14a. What is the Nash equilibrium if both individuals make their
1. 2.1 In a repeated game, how does the outcome differ if firms know that the game will be (a) repeated indefi nitely, (b) repeated a known, finite number of times, or (c) repeated a finite number of times but the firms are unsure as to which period will be the last period?(Hint: See Solved Problem
1.1. 18 For the examples of two-sided markets in Tables 13.4 and 13.5, would the firms change their strate gies were they to merge (form one firm) or collude(coordinate activities)?2. Dynamic Games
1. 1. 17 In the Application “Strategic Advertising,” would the cola advertising or cigarette advertising game be an example of a prisoners’ dilemma game?
1. 1. 16 The 100-meter Olympic gold medalist and the 200 meter Olympic gold medalist have agreed to a 150 meter duel. Before the race, each athlete decides whether to improve his performance by taking anabolic steroids. Each athlete’s payoff is 20 from winning the race, 10 from tying, and 0 from
1. 1. 15 Suppose that you and a friend play a matching pen nies game in which each of you uncovers a penny.If both pennies show heads or both show tails, you keep both. If one shows heads and the other shows tails, your friend keeps them. Show the pay off matrix. What, if any, is the pure-strategy
1. 1. 14 In the episode “A Study in Pink” of the BBC’s television series Sherlock, a cab driver abducts his passengers and offers them a deal. The driver puts two bottles on a table, one close to the victim and the other close to himself. Both of them contain an identical pill, and the
1. 1. 13 How does the equilibria in Exercise 1.12 change if you modify the payoff matrix such that the payoff for the person who continues to drive down the middle of the road is 11 when the other driver swerves? M
1. 1. 12 Eva and Ethan love attending sports events, espe cially when they go together. However, Eva prefers watching field hockey while Ethan would rather go to a cricket match. If they go together, the payoff is higher for the person who favors the sports event more (payoff = 3), and less for the
1. 1. 11 Suppose that Panasonic and LG are the only two firms that can produce a new type of holographic TV. The payoff matrix shows the firms’ profits (in millions of dollars):Panasonic Enter–40 Enter LG Do Not Enter–40 Do Not Enter 250 0250 00 0510 CHAPTER 13 Game Theorya. If both firms
1. 1. 10 Takashi Hashiyama, president of the Japanese elec tronics firm Maspro Denkoh Corporation, was torn between commissioning Christie’s or Sothe by’s to auction the company’s $20 million art col lection, which included a van Gogh, a Cézanne, and an early Picasso (Carol Vogel, “Rock,
1. 1. 9 In the battle of the sexes game, the husband likes to go to the mountains on vacation, and the wife prefers the ocean, but they both prefer to take their vacations together.Husband Mountains Mountains 21 Wife–1 Beach–1 Beach–1 2–1 1What are the Nash equilibria? Discuss whether this
1. 1. 8 Suppose Wizz Air and Lufthansa are considering enter ing a new route, from Kutaisi in Georgia to Cologne in Germany. Their annual profits, in thousands of euros, from entering or staying out from the route are Lufthansa Enter–50 Do Not Enter 0Enter Wizz Air Do Not Enter 100 0250 150 00 If
1. *1. 7 What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the game in Exercise 1.6? M
1. 1. 6 Suppose that two firms face the following payoff matrix:Firm 1 Low Price Low Price Firm 2 High Price 20 0High Price 21 76 6Given these payoffs, Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1’s price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2’s price. What, if any, are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of
1. 1. 5 Ambi wants her daughter, Aasa, to succeed at school.She decides to reward Aasa if her grades are above 90% of her class. If it is not, then Aasa will not be rewarded. The payoff matrix is Aasa 90th Percentile Reward Ambi No Reward 21 Lower Percentile 42 03–1 1Exercises 509 If they choose
1. 1. 4 Suppose Procter & Gamble (PG) and Johnson & John son (JNJ) are simultaneously considering new advertis ing campaigns. Each firm may choose a high, medium, or low level of advertising. What are each firm’s best responses to its rival’s strategies? Does either firm have a dominant
1. *1. 3 Two firms must simultaneously decide which quality to manufacture. The profit matrix (in tens of thou sands of euros) is Firm 1 Low Low 11 Medium 121 19 High 612 Firm 2 25 Medium High 16 524 23 14 26 423 17 11 Identify all the Nash equilibria in this game. (See Solved Problem 13.1.)
1. 1. 2 Show that advertising is a dominant strategy for both firms in both panels of Table 13.3. Explain why that pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
1.*1. 1 Show the payoff matrix and explain the reason ing in the prisoners’ dilemma example where Larry and Duncan, possible criminals, will get one year in prison if neither talks; if one talks, one goes free and the other gets five years; and if both talk, both get two years. (Note: The payoffs
1. 7. 5 Use a diagram similar to Figure 12.7 to illustrate the effect of social media on the demand for Super Bowl commercials. (Hint: See the Application “Super Bowl Commercials.”)8. Challenge
1. 7. 2 A monopoly’s inverse demand function is p = 588 -8Q + 4A0.5, where Q is its quantity, p is its price, and A is its level of advertising. Its marginal cost of pro duction is 50, and its marginal cost of advertising is 1.What is the firm’s profit function? Solve for the firm’s
1. 6.4 Why do Honda service departments emphasize to cus tomers the importance of using “genuine Honda parts”when servicing and tuning Honda cars and motorcy cles? Is Honda likely to be as successful as Hewlett Packard in the Application “Ties That Bind”?7. Advertising
1. 6.2 A computer hardware firm sells both laptop comput ers and printers. Through the magic of focus groups, their pricing team determines that they have an equal number of three types of customers, and that these customers’ reservation prices are Laptop Customer A Customer B Customer C$800
1. 5.6 Explain why charging a higher or lower price than p = 10 reduces the monopoly’s profit in Figure 12.5.Show the monopoly’s profit if p = 20 and compare it to its profit if p = 10.6. Tie-In Sales
1. 5.5 As described in the Application “Pricing iTunes,” Shiller and Waldfogel (2011) estimated that if iTunes used two part pricing charging an annual access fee and a low price per song, it would raise its profit by about 30%relative to what it would earn using uniform pricing or variable
1.5.4 Katri from Question 5.3 has two brothers, Risto and Camilo, who are event managers and are therefore looking for a local professional photog rapher for events they organize in Skarszewò. Gas par believes that Risto’s inverse demand curve is pR = 3.5- q 200 and Camilo’s inverse demand
1.5.3 Katri is getting married soon in the small town of Skarszewò, and she wants Gaspar to take photos documenting the ceremony and wedding reception.Her inverse demand function is p = 3- q 200 , where q is the number of professional photos taken during the day. Gaspar, being the only
1. 5.2 Many retail business establishments that serve cold beverages, levy a cover charge (or entrance fee) in addition to per drink fees. Suppose the firm is a monopoly and sells to two groups of 16 customers each: people who drink more (Group 1) and people who drink less (Group 2). The demand
1.4.4 Consider the nonlinear price discrimination analysis in panel a of Figure 12.4.a. Suppose that the monopoly can make consumers a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The monopoly sets a price, p*, and a minimum quantity, Q*, that a consumer must pay to be able to purchase any units at all. What price
1. 5. Two-Part Pricing“U.S. motorists are essentially subsidizing European drivers, who pay more for taxes but substantially less into oil company profits” (Tom Doggett, “US Drivers Subsidize European Pump Prices,” Reuters, August 31, 2006). Given that oil companies have market power and
1. 3.15 According to a report from the Foundation for Tax payer and Consumer Rights, gasoline costs twice as much in Europe as in the United States because taxes are higher in Europe. However, the amount per gallon net of taxes that U.S. consumers pay is higher than that paid by Europeans. The
1. 3.14 Show that the equilibrium elasticities in the two countries must be equal in Solved Problem 12.3. M
1.3.12 How would the analysis in Solved Problem 12.2 change if m = 70 or if m = 40? (Hint: Where m = 40, the marginal cost curve crosses the MR curve three times—if we include the vertical section.The single-price monopoly will choose one of these three points where its profit is maximized.)
1. * 3.10 Warner Home Entertainment sold the Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban two-DVD movie set in China for about $3, which was only one-fifth the U.S.price, and sold about 100,000 units. The price was extremely low in China because Chinese consumers are less wealthy and because
1. 3.9 A copyright gives Warner Brothers the legal monopoly to produce and sell the Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows Part 2 DVD. Warner Brothers engaged in group price discrimination by charging different prices in the United States and the United Kingdom.Warner Brothers can ignore the problem
1. 3.8 Suppose a bottle of Pomfrey’s coconut vinegar costs£4.99 (€5.50) in the United Kingdom, ₹110 (€1.28)in India, and PLN 12.99 (€2.89) in Poland. Assum ing Pomfrey sellers have a constant marginal cost of €0.70, determine what the elasticities of demand must be in the United
1. *3.7 A monopoly sells its good in the U.S. and Japanese markets. The American inverse demand function is pA = 100- QA, and the Japanese inverse demand function is pJ = 80- 2QJ, where both prices, pA and pJ, are measured in dollars. The firm’s marginal cost of production is m = 20 in both
1.3.5 The estimated Tesla demand function for the S 100D car is QA = 78- 0.6pA in the United States and QE = 36.8- 0.16pE in Europe, as Figure 12.3 illus trates. Using that and other information from the Application “Tesla Price Discrimination,” confirm that Tesla’s profit-maximizing prices
1.3.4 Hershey Park sells tickets at the gate and at local municipal offices to two groups of people. Suppose that the demand function for people who purchase tickets at the gate is QG = 10,000- 100pG and that the demand function for people who purchase tickets at municipal offices is QG = 9,000-
1.2.5 A firm is a natural monopoly (see Chapter 11). Its marginal cost curve is flat, and its average cost curve is downward sloping (because it has a fixed cost). The firm can perfectly price discriminate. Use a graph to show how much the monopoly produces, Q*. Show graphically and mathematically
1. 2.2 Using the information in the Application “Botox and Price Discrimination” and the Application “Botox Patent Monopoly” in Chapter 11, determine how much Allergan loses by being a single-price monop oly rather than a perfectly price-discriminating monopoly. Explain.
1. 1. 8 The European Commission charged six U.S. studios and a U.K. pay television company, Sky UK, with unfairly blocking access to films and other content.The charges challenge the studios’ requirement under contracts that Sky UK block access for con sumers outside Britain and Ireland. The
1. 1. 6 A monopoly that sells internationally will often try to sell its product at different prices in different countries.Consider distributors for a monopoly that are located in two countries that are adjacent to each other. The inverse demand curves in the two countries are p1=40 - 2Q1 and p2=
1. 1. 5 Disneyland price discriminates by charging lower entry fees for children than for adults and for local residents than for other visitors. Why does it not have a resale problem? (Hint: See the Application“Disneyland Pricing.”)
1.*1. 4 Many colleges provide students from low-income families with scholarships, subsidized loans, and other programs so that they pay lower tuitions than students from high-income families. Explain why universities behave this way.
1. 1. 3 Retail outlets in Poland occasionally organize promo tions knows as Shopping Nights. Prominent brands such iSpot, Rossman, Ikea, and 5.10.15 participate in this event in which for a few hours late at night, customers can buy goods at significantly discounted prices. Why are these offers
1. 1. 2 Alexx’s monopoly currently sells its product at a single price. What are the necessary conditions so that he can profitably price discriminate?
1.1. 1 Many pharmaceutical companies provide low income older people with a card guaranteeing them discounts on prescription medicines. As of 2018, such companies included GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Pfizer, and Roche, along with many others. Why would these firms provide discount drug cards?
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