1. Consider the following interaction between a single long lived firm, and a sequence of short-lived consumer. In each period t = 1, 2..., there is a single consumer who only lives for one period. The consumer must choose between the actions BUY and NOT BUY (i.e. B and N). The firm must chooose what quality level to provide, i.e. it must choose between H and L. The payoffs to the two parties are given by the following table, | where th> p > V_and p > Ch> CL. H L B | VH-p, p - CH VL-P, p - CL N 0,0 0,0 a) Solve for the Nash equilibria of the above stage game. b) Suppose that the firm discounts payoffs at rate o, where 0 p > V_and p > Ch> CL. H L B | VH-p, p - CH VL-P, p - CL N 0,0 0,0 a) Solve for the Nash equilibria of the above stage game. b) Suppose that the firm discounts payoffs at rate o, where 0