1. Consider the single object allocation problem discussed in the class. A single object needs to be allocated to one of as agents. Each agent has a value . that is, the utility he derives from the object. if given for free. The game is as follows: I Each playarfagent simultaneously announces a non-negative number - call it his bid. Denote the bid by player i as hi 2 D. I Highest bidder wins the object - in case of a tie. the bidder with the lowest index wins (for instance. if agents 2. 3, 5 have the highest bid, then 2 wins the object). o The winner gets the object for freel i.e., does not pay anything. All other agents ( i.e., those who don't get the object) receive a payment equal to the highest bid amount. (a) Formulate the game in Normal Form. (b) Verify whether the game has a weak dominant strategy equilibrium. Explain why. or why not