Consider the single object allocation problem. A single object needs to be allocated to one of n agents. Each agent has a value, that is, the utility they derive from the object, if given for free. The game is as follows: 0 Each player/ agent simultaneously announces a nonnegative number call it his bid. Denote the bid by player 2', as b, 2 0. 0 Highest bidder wins the object in case of a tie, the bidder with the lowest index wins (for instance, if agents 2, 3, 5 have the highest bid, then 2 wins the object). o The winner gets the object for free, i.e., does not pay anything. All other agents ( i.e., those who don't get the object) receive a payment equal to the highest bid amount. (a) Formulate the game in Normal Form. (b) Verify whether the game has a weak dominant strategy equilibrium. Explain why, or why not