1.2 In this problem we revisit the voting game we saw in class. Let's recall the main features of the problem. There are two candidates, each of whom chooses one of ten political positions. The voters are equally distributed across these ten positions, so there is a 10 percent of the electorate in each position. Voters vote for the candidate whose position is closest to theirs. If the two candidates are equidistant from a given position, the voters at that position split their votes equally. The aim of the candidates is to maximize their percentage of the total vote. In class we showed that position 1 is strictly dominated by position 2 for both candidates. However, position 1 is itself strictly dominated by other strategies. For example, position 1 is strictly dominated by position 3. Find some other position (other than 3) that strictly dominates position 1. In the problems that follow we will review the notion of mixed strategy in several games. In particular, we will revisit the notion of expected payoff and illustrate the role that mixing can have on the iterative process of elimination of strictly dominated strategies