29.3 (1} Let us eonaider a more general version of the voluntary public goods game deactibed in the previous question. This game has N players, each of whom can contribute either $10 or nothing to the public fund' All money that is contributed to the public fund gets multiplied by some number B :3 l and then divided equally among all players in the game {including those who do not contribute.) Thus if all N players contribute $10 to the fund, the amount of money available to be divided among the N players will be $lUBN and each player will get $IUBNXN = $103 back from the public fund. (a) If B )- 11 which of the following outcomes gives the higher payoff to each player? a) All players contribute their 310 or b) all players keep their 510. ' l. (b) Suppose that exactly K of the other players contribute. If you keep your $10, you will have this $10 plus you: share of the public fund contributed by others. What. will your payoff be in this. case? |:|. If you contribute your 510, what will be the total number of eontributors'D What will be your payoff? :1- (e) 1TB : 3 and N : 5' what is the dominant strategy equilibrium for this NAME 355 (d) In general, what relationship between B and N must hold for \"Keep" to be a. dominant strategy? I l