3. Consider an IPV setting with a bidders with types that are independently and identi- cally distributed over [0, 100] according to the cdf F(x). i) What are the equilibrium strategies of a SPA with reserve price, 30? ii) In the equilibrium you computed above, what is the probability a bidder with type x > 30 obtains the good? iii) Suppose a FPA is conducted in the same environment also with a reserve price of 30. Suppose (as is the case) there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where bidders with types r 2 30 select a symmetric and strictly increasing bid function b(2) with the property that b(30) = 30. In this auction, what is the probability a bidder with type > 30 obtains the good? iv) From your answers to ii) and iii), what can you conclude about the expected revenues in each of these two auctions? 4. You are a bidder in a SMA auction of 4 licenses, A, B, C, D. Licenses A, B, C are worth 100 eligibility points and license D is worth 200. The activity rule is 1 (bidding or being a PWB on a license worth X activity points allows you to retain X eligibility points for the next round.) The eligibility points a bidder has going into a new round include points that come from being a PWB on licenses. Withdrawals are not permitted. Explain what will be the answer in the following independent scenarios. i) From the previous round, you are PWB on licenses A and C and have a total of 400 eligibility points. Which licenses can you bid on in the next round? ii) From the previous round, you are PWB on license D and have a total of 200 eligibility points. Which licenses can you bid on in the next round? iii) In the previous round, you were PWB on license D and submitted bids on A and B. You were outbid on D and became PWB on A. Which licenses can you bid on in the next round