5. Consider the following game in which Nature (N) chooses the Player 1's. type as Tough...

 

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5. Consider the following game in which Nature (N) chooses the Player 1's. type as Tough (T) with probability p and Weak (W) with probability 1 - - p. Player 1 observes his type and chooses Fight (F) or Not Fight (NF). Player 2 observes the actions of the Player 1 but not his type, and chooses Yield (Y) or Not Yield (NY). When T Y NY F 3,1 1,0 NF 2,1 0,0 When W Y NY F 2,0 0,1 NF 3,0 3,0 1,1 Find the set of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. 5. Consider the following game in which Nature (N) chooses the Player 1's. type as Tough (T) with probability p and Weak (W) with probability 1 - - p. Player 1 observes his type and chooses Fight (F) or Not Fight (NF). Player 2 observes the actions of the Player 1 but not his type, and chooses Yield (Y) or Not Yield (NY). When T Y NY F 3,1 1,0 NF 2,1 0,0 When W Y NY F 2,0 0,1 NF 3,0 3,0 1,1 Find the set of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game.