5. Continuing with the diffusion model from Chapter 19, recall that the threshold aw derived from a coordination game that each node plays with each of its neighbor Specifically, if nodes v and w are each trying to decide whether to choose behav A and B, then if v and w both adopt behavior A, they each get a payoff of a 0; if they both adopt B, they each get a payoff of b 0; and if they adopt opposite behaviors, they each get a payoff of 0. The total payoff for any one node is determined by adding up the payoffs it gets from the coordination game with each neighbor. Let's now consider a slightly more general version of the mode in which the payoff for choosing opposite behaviors is not 0, but some small positive num Specifically, suppose we replace the third point above with the following if they adopt opposite behaviors, they each get a payoff of x, where x positive number that is less than both a and B 5. Continuing with the diffusion model from Chapter 19, recall that the threshold aw derived from a coordination game that each node plays with each of its neighbor Specifically, if nodes v and w are each trying to decide whether to choose behav A and B, then if v and w both adopt behavior A, they each get a payoff of a 0; if they both adopt B, they each get a payoff of b 0; and if they adopt opposite behaviors, they each get a payoff of 0. The total payoff for any one node is determined by adding up the payoffs it gets from the coordination game with each neighbor. Let's now consider a slightly more general version of the mode in which the payoff for choosing opposite behaviors is not 0, but some small positive num Specifically, suppose we replace the third point above with the following if they adopt opposite behaviors, they each get a payoff of x, where x positive number that is less than both a and B