#9 please

Question D8 Consider a Bertrand oligopolv where two firms [Firms 1 and 2] sell goods that are imperfect substitutes and compete by choosing prices simultaneously. Their market demands are 3 3 1 [f1 = 1:200 _Epl + i132: [f2 = 300 2P2 +1.91 For simplicity, assume the marginal cost is zero for both firms [M61 = M52 = 0]. Find the best response curve of each firm. Which of the following alternatives is correct? {a} Firm 1's best response curve is p1 = 4-00 + 0.5332 {b} Firm 2's best response curve is p; = 400 + 0.5301 {c} Firm 1's best response curve is oi = 45 [1.5432 {d} Firm 2's best response curve is p; = 200 + 0.8m Question 09 Consider the same information in question 08. Find the optimal price and quantity of each firm. Hint: Start by finding the Nash equilibrium, that is, the combination of mutual best responses. Which of the following alternatives is correct? (a) For firm 1, p1 = $1,600/3 and q1 = 800/3 (b) For firm 1, p, = $800 and q1 = 1,600/3 (c) For firm 2, p2 = $800/3 and q2 = 1,600/3 (d) For firm 2, p2 = $1,600 and 92 = 800