A time period is indexed by t = n, . . . , 1, where period n is the starting period and period 1 is the final period. Player 1 makes an offer in every odd period, and player 2 makes an offer in every even period. Let(x t , 1x t ) denote an offer made in period t which gives x t to player 1 and 1 x t to player 2. If they cannot agree even in period 1, both of get payoffs of 0. If they agree to a division of (x , 1 x ) in period t , the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are nt 1 x and nt 2 (1 x ), respectively. (Note 1 ,2 can in principle be different). In all of the following questions, restrict attention to subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. (a) In period 1, what offer does player 2 accept? What offer does player 1 make to player 2, and does player 2 accept this offer? What are their payoffs? (b) In period 2, what offer does player 1 accept? What offer does player 2 make to player, and does player 1 accept