Consider the following game: 1,2 U M D L M R 8,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,12...

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Consider the following game: 1,2 U M D L M R 8,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,12 0,14 0,0 14,0 6,6 (a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria assuming the game is only played once. (b) Which outcomes in the game are Pareto-efficient? (c) Suppose this game is played twice. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which (M, M) is played in the first period? Would payoffs in this equilibrium be higher than the subgame perfect equilibrium in which (U, L) is played twice? (d) Suppose players have the option of a renegotiation after the first stage. Is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium you identified in the previous subquestion robust to a renegotiation? Explain your answer. Consider the following game: 1,2 U M D L M R 8,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,12 0,14 0,0 14,0 6,6 (a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria assuming the game is only played once. (b) Which outcomes in the game are Pareto-efficient? (c) Suppose this game is played twice. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which (M, M) is played in the first period? Would payoffs in this equilibrium be higher than the subgame perfect equilibrium in which (U, L) is played twice? (d) Suppose players have the option of a renegotiation after the first stage. Is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium you identified in the previous subquestion robust to a renegotiation? Explain your answer.