Consider a situation in which two competing companies choose between two technologies to manufacture a product. Technology A is a clean technology. Technology B pollutes a nearby river whose water both companies use as an input factor in their production process. The table below shows the yearly profit for each company (expressed in $1000) depending on the chosen technologies.

(a) Find the Nash equilibrium of the above game assuming it is played only once. Clearly state which action each player chooses in the Nash equilibrium.

(b) More realistically, assume now that the two companies interact repeatedly. To be more precise, the game depicted above is played in year 1, year 2, year 3 and so on, and because it makes sense to discount profits over time, we assume a discount factor of 0.95 per year. In this repeated game, is it a Nash equilibrium for both companies to choose Technology A in all years? Explain your answer.