Consider the following modified BoS game with incomplete information. Player 2 has two types: type I...

 

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Consider the following modified BoS game with incomplete information. Player 2 has two types: type I loves going out with player 1 whereas type h hates it. Player 1 has only one type and is uncertain about player 2's type. She believes that each type is equally likely. The following tables give the payoffs to each action and type profile: type 1 B S B 2,1 S 0,0 0,0 1,2 type h BS B 2,0 0,2 S 0,1 1,0 (a) Find its set of ex ante Bayesian Nash equilibria. (b) Find its set of interim Bayesian Nash equilibria. Consider the following modified BoS game with incomplete information. Player 2 has two types: type I loves going out with player 1 whereas type h hates it. Player 1 has only one type and is uncertain about player 2's type. She believes that each type is equally likely. The following tables give the payoffs to each action and type profile: type 1 B S B 2,1 S 0,0 0,0 1,2 type h BS B 2,0 0,2 S 0,1 1,0 (a) Find its set of ex ante Bayesian Nash equilibria. (b) Find its set of interim Bayesian Nash equilibria.

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a Ex Ante Bayesian Nash Equilibrium In an ex ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium each players strategy is optimal given their beliefs about the other playe... View the full answer