$($d$)$ What is each council member$$s payoff in this equilibrium? Consider the same game, except that the council members make an unbreakable promise that all their resistance must be done publicly. That is$,$ the council members impose a rule that r$1=$ r$2=0,$ while allowing any pi $0.$ In this case, the payoff functions are u$1($p$1,$ p$2)=2$p$1$ p$21$ p$1=$ p$1$ p$21$ u$2($p$1,$ p$2)=2$p$2$ p$22$ p$2=$ p$2$ p$22($e$)$ Find each council member$$s best response and the Nash equilibrium of the game. $($Hint: Dominant strategy.$)($f$)$ Does such an unbreakable promise benefit the council members? Explain your answer in a sentence or two. $($g$)$ Does this remind you of a simple strategic environment? Which one? Explain your answer in a sentence or two.