$($d$)$ What is each council member$$s payoff in this equilibrium?

Consider the same game, except that the council members make an unbreakable

promise that all their resistance must be done publicly. That is$,$ the council mem$-$

bers impose a rule that r $1=$ r $2=0,$ while allowing any p i $0.$ In this case, the payoff

functions are

u $1($p $1,$ p $2)=2$p $1$ p $2$

$1$ p $1=$ p $1$ p $2$

$1$

u $2($p $1,$ p $2)=2$p $2$ p $2$

$2$ p $2=$ p $2$ p $2$

$2$

$($e$)$ Find each council member$$s best response and the Nash equilibrium of the game.

$($Hint: Dominant strategy.$)$

$($f$)$ Does such an unbreakable promise benefit the council members? Explain your

answer in a sentence or two.

$($g$)$ Does this remind you of a simple strategic environment? Which one? Explain

your answer in a sentence or two.