Exercise 1 There are two players A and B. Player B can be of two types t {0,1} with Pr(t=1)=p [0.1]. The actions and payoffs of the game are given by: | v | R 0. 4(1-1 '\" where the row player is player A. We will use the following notation: * oy probability that player A plays U e op: probability that player B plays L if she is of type t. Part I (2 marks): Complete information (No explanation needed) (i) {1 mark) Suppose p = 1. That is, player B's type 1s t = 1 for sure. State all Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies in the following format: (a-.'h]} ={.,.) (ii) (1 mark) Suppose p = 0. That is, player B's type is t = 0 for sure. State all Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies in the following format: (02, O0) = (., .)