2. Individual Problems 15-2 Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their '"tes "cancel each other out." They each gain 30 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 30 units of utility ftTm a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 15 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Mr. Ward Don't Vote Vote Mr. Ward: -15, Mrs. Ward: -15 Mr. Ward: -30, Mrs. Ward: 15 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 15, Mrs. Ward: -30 Mr. Ward: O, Mrs. Ward: 0 V and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to '"te in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. o Tru e O False This agreement not to vote a Nash equilibrium.