Hello, I need some help understanding these questions:

Fehr-Schmidt and the Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma In the standard prisoners' dilemma, two players choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D), where mutual cooperation leads to mutually higher rewards but defection leads to individually higher rewards. In the simultaneous version, each player chooses before knowing the strategy chosen by the other player. Consider the sequential prisoners' dilemma game: the first mover chooses either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D), after which the second mover observes the first mover's choice and then himself chooses either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). Specifically, consider the following example. 2 c 2 c c Suppose initially that both players are egoistic, specifically, let u 32. What is 2's best response, if I cooperates? 33. What is 2's best response, if I defects? 34. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (CC, CD, DC, or DD)?