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8. Understanding grim trigger strategies Suppose only two firms, Tying-the-Knot and Bridezilla-No-More, offer high-class wedding planning services. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) of each company, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its services. Tying-the-Knot and Bridezilla-No-More are both profit-maximizing firms. Bridezilla-No-More Low High Low $7. $7 $15. $4 Tying-the-Knot High $4. $15 $9, $9 The Nash equilibrium of this game is for Tying-the-Knot to set a _ price and Bridezilla-No-More to set a * price. True or False: Both firms would be better off if they colluded and set a high price for their services, instead of using the Nash equilibrium. O True O False Suppose that the firms play this game indefinitely. Both firms agree to collude in order to maintain higher profits. To deter cheating, Tying-the-Knot announces that it will play a grim trigger strategy. Given this strategy, what will happen if Bridezilla-No-More breaks the collusive agreement in the first period? Check all that apply. O Bridezilla-No-More will play Low in the second period. O Beginning in the period after cheating has occurred, both firms will play Low forever. O Tying-the-Knot will play High in the second period. Tying-the-Knot will play Low in the second and third periods and then High until Bridezilla-No-More breaks the agreement again.ving-the-Knot to fet I price and Bridezilla-No-Ma off if they colluded and price for their servic highNo-More to set a price. low services, Instead the Nash equilib high