1. How does statutory law come into existence? How does it differ from the common law? If statutory law conflicts with the common law, which will govern?

2. Until recently, every state had a statute outlawing the burning of American flags. But in Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court declared such statutes unconstitutional, saying that flag burning is symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment. Does Congress have the power to overrule the Courts decision?

3. You are a trial court judge in Iowas state court system and that Sampson v. Partridge is one of the civil cases that you must decide. Your research has revealed that the critical issue in Sampson is the same issue presented in Capitol v. Davidson, a 1998 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa (the highest appellate court in the Iowa system). The Capitol decision established a new common law rule for Iowa. Your research has also revealed that in 2009, the Iowa legislature enacted a statute that states a rule different from the common law rule established in Capitol. You believe, however, that the 2009 statute offers an unwise rule, and that the common law rule set forth in Capitol amounts to much better policy. In deciding the Sampson case, are you free to apply the Capitol rule? Why or why not?

CASE

United States v. Lynch Background:

The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act (FACE), a federal statute, provides for penalties against anyone who by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction blocks entrance to a provider of reproductive health services. Lynch and Moscinski blocked access to the Women's Medical Pavilion, a clinic offering such services. The government sought an injunction prohibiting Lynch and Moscinski from impeding access to or coming within fifteen feet of the clinic. A federal district court issued the injunction after finding that Lynch and Moscinski had violated the statute by making entrance to the clinic unreasonably difficult. Lynch and Moscinski moved to amend the order on the ground that the court's opinion had not addressed their natural law argument. The district court denied the motion, and Lynch and Moscinski appealed. Opinion, Per Curiam: Defendants concede that they willfully intended to impede and did impede access to the WMP. Their only defense was their contention that the FACE statute protects the taking of innocent human life, and is therefore contrary to natural law and accordingly null and void. Defendants' sole contention on appeal is that the district court declined to address their only defense based on natural law. We find it abundantly clear from the record that the district court considered and rejected this defense. Judge Sprizzo stated, " I don't recognize my authority to refuse to issue an injunction under natural law," and "I don't have the right to act my own private conscience." He pointedly explained to defense counsel: The seal above my head says this is Caesar's court. This is not a church, this is not a temple, this is not a mosque. And we don't live in a theocracy. This is a court of law. I will look at all the legal issues. Thus the district court did fully and forcefully address and deny defendants' natural law defense. We agree with the district court's conclusion that natural law cannot furnish a valid basis upon which to nullify the FACE statute, or the injunction issued pursuant to it. Defendants cite, among others, Pope John Paul Il's encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologia, and Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously. For better or worse, as the case may be, these texts do not control our decision in this case. "The Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts and the people." Testa v. Katt. Defendants do not argue that FACE is unconstitutional. They argue instead that FACE (and abortion) are anathema, and thus violate principles superior to the Constitution. Under Supreme Court precedent, well-settled constitutional principles, and the rule of stare decisis, we decline to invalidate a federal statute on the basis of natural law principles.