I need help with this game theory question...

Consider the following two player game Column Player "m "m The row player can choose to play either 'In' or 'Out', as can the column player. The table tells you the outcome for each player (row player rst) depending on the strategy of both (so for example, if both row player and column player play 'Out', then both receive 1). a and I) represent real numbers. Consider the level k model we discussed in class. Assume that level 0 players play 'In' 50% of the time and 'Out' 50% of the time. Remember that level 1 players best respond to level 0 players and level 2 players best respond to level 1 players. 1. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game for different values of a and b 2. Find values for a and I) such a level 1 column player will play 'In' 3. Find values for a and b such a level 1 row player will play 'In' 4. Find values for a and I) such a level 2 column player will play 'In' 5. Find values for a and b such a level 2 row player will play 'In' 6. Hard: Is it always the case that as the level of each player goes to co, the play of the game converges to Nash? If not, can you put conditions 11 a and b for which this is the case