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Player 2 Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 5' After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1'? b) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 5. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? c) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 5. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? d) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? e) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? f) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game