Player 2 Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 17 = I b} (0.5 marks) Suppose = 2 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 27 x I c) (1 marks) Suppose z = 2 and y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? M2 w0 = d} (0.5 marks) Suppose = 3 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 17 I e) (0.5 marks) Suppose = 3 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strateqy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 27 - = = w = oY & = x = o & m B = dand y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? 2 x