Player 2 Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose a: = 4 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? D b) (0.5 marks) Suppose :1: = 4 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? D c) (1 marks) Suppose 2: = 4 and y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? D d) (0.5 marks) Suppose :1: = 3 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? D e) (0.5 marks) Suppose a: = 3 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? D f) [1 marks) Suppose 33 = 3 and y = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? D