Instructions Synthesized the below article. Task: write an article about "Philippine Politics and Governance " using the article below. Include proper citation and references about yhe below article..

Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment DAVID G. TIMBERMAN JANUARY 10, 2019PAPER Source: Getty Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change, continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the Philippines. INTRODUCTION Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the countrys infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Dutertes murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally. ABOUT CONTACT SUPPORT DONATE Carnegie Endowment for International Peace SEARCH GLOBAL RESOURCES Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment DAVID G. TIMBERMAN JANUARY 10, 2019PAPER Source: Getty Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change, continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the Philippines. Related Media and Tools Print Page

INTRODUCTION Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the countrys infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Dutertes murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been paid to his administrations broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and regression. The Duterte governments track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the countrys democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administrations assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what the U.S. government and Americas nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend democracy in Americas former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of Americas extremely limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a more robust response. ANTECEDENTS To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since 1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (20102016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election. THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY Liberal democracy, a legacy of Americas colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to 1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial legacies (Americas empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption. ABOUT CONTACT SUPPORT DONATE Carnegie Endowment for International Peace SEARCH GLOBAL RESOURCES Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment DAVID G. TIMBERMAN JANUARY 10, 2019PAPER Source: Getty Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change, continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the Philippines. Related Media and Tools Print Page

INTRODUCTION Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the countrys infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Dutertes murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

David G. Timberman David G. Timberman is an independent scholar and development practitioner who has addressed the challenges of democratic politics and governance in Southeast Asia for over thirty years. Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been paid to his administrations broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and regression.

The Duterte governments track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the countrys democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administrations assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what the U.S. government and Americas nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend democracy in Americas former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of Americas extremely limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a more robust response.

ANTECEDENTS To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since 1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (20102016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election.

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY Liberal democracy, a legacy of Americas colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to 1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial legacies (Americas empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored many of the pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view 1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of political competition have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986 see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies that have benefited elites and special interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional justice system. However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has worked fairly well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights; regular, competitive elections for local and national offices; a system of checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and robust civil society. The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as well as economic integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines gross domestic product (GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics, governance, and the economy. ABOUT CONTACT SUPPORT DONATE Carnegie Endowment for International Peace SEARCH GLOBAL RESOURCES Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment DAVID G. TIMBERMAN JANUARY 10, 2019 PAPER Source: Getty Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change, continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the Philippines. Related Media and Tools Print Page

INTRODUCTION Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the countrys infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Dutertes murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

David G. Timberman David G. Timberman is an independent scholar and development practitioner who has addressed the challenges of democratic politics and governance in Southeast Asia for over thirty years. Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been paid to his administrations broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and regression.

The Duterte governments track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the countrys democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administrations assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what the U.S. government and Americas nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend democracy in Americas former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of Americas extremely limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a more robust response.

ANTECEDENTS To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since 1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (20102016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election.

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY Liberal democracy, a legacy of Americas colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to 1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial legacies (Americas empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored many of the pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view 1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of political competition have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986 see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies that have benefited elites and special interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional justice system.

However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has worked fairly well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights; regular, competitive elections for local and national offices; a system of checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and robust civil society. The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as well as economic integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines gross domestic product (GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics, governance, and the economy.

PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous commonwealth, the behavior of presidents and other powerful political and economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of the countrys democratic politics and governance.1 The Philippines is a unitary state with a winner-take-all electoral system, a presidency that exercises huge power over budgets and appointments, and congenitally weak political parties. As a result, the president plays a central role in determining policy outcomes, as well as the norms and behavior that shape politics and governance.

The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is the countrys remarkably resilient political and economic elite. The president is limited to a single six-year term, so the power and influence of individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business families such as the Marcoses, Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalasto name just a fewhave had noteworthy longevity and adaptability.2 They exert a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking, regulatory bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government resources. For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong state by limiting the governments fiscal base and co-opting, corrupting, or intimidating the bureaucracy. It has stunted and distorted the Philippine economy, preferring collusion and protection over economic competition, and has been slow and selective in opening the economy to foreign competition. Because elites dominate legislative and policymaking processes, successive governments have failed to adopt and implement socioeconomic policies that address the needs of the poor and middle class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the Philippines has long been one of the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of poverty incidence among Asias developing economies. Even after more than a decade of relatively strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in 2015.3 Today, by the World Banks metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a per capita income of $3,600 and a consumption-driven economy that has been growing at about 6.5 percent per year for most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business process outsourcing sector.4 As a result, the countrys sizable, predominantly urban, middle class now comprises 15 to 20 percent of the population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century, the rich have become richer, the middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-quarter of the population remains poor. THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT AND LIMITS OF REFORMISM The real change promised by Rodrigo Duterte has obscured how much positive change occurred under the administration of Benigno Aquino III (20102016).6 Aquinos promise to follow the straight path was an effort to both appropriate his mothers (Corazon Aquino) perceived integrity and draw a sharp contrast with the pervasive corruption associated with the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (20012010).7 Notable successes of the Aquino government included passing reproductive health and sin tax reform laws, implementing twelve years of basic education, extending public finance reform, expanding fiscal space and social spending, and making an effort to provide greater autonomy to Muslims in Mindanao. GDP growth reached 6.5 percent, and by virtually every measure the countrys international standing improved significantly. As a result, Aquino remained popular throughout most of his term.

To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes. Macroeconomic growth was slow to reduce poverty, and the government was unable to rapidly improve infrastructure, especially in traffic-clogged Metro Manila. It did little to reform dysfunctional food and agriculture policies, and could have done more to strengthen anticorruption institutions and to pass a freedom of information law. In terms of governance, Aquino was widely seen as honest, but he sometimes valued loyalty over competence and occasionally seemed to lack the empathy that Filipinos expect from their political leaders. His administration also suffered from complacency (due to the presidents personal popularity), problems communicating its accomplishments, and its failure to make the Liberal Party a more coherent and durable political party. And when it came time to choose a successor, Aquino remained committed to supporting Manuel Mar Roxas, his secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)even though opinion polls consistently indicated that Roxas would not win.8 ABOUT CONTACT SUPPORT DONATE Carnegie Endowment for International Peace SEARCH GLOBAL RESOURCES Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment DAVID G. TIMBERMAN JANUARY 10, 2019 PAPER Source: Getty Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change, continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the Philippines. Related Media and Tools Print Page

INTRODUCTION Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the countrys infamous dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Dutertes murderous war on drugs as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

David G. Timberman David G. Timberman is an independent scholar and development practitioner who has addressed the challenges of democratic politics and governance in Southeast Asia for over thirty years. Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been paid to his administrations broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of change, continuity, and regression.

The Duterte governments track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the countrys democratic institutions. The combination of the Philippines powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administrations assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what the U.S. government and Americas nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend democracy in Americas former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of Americas extremely limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and offers suggestions for a more robust response.

ANTECEDENTS To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since 1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (20102016); and the particularities of the 2016 presidential election.

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY Liberal democracy, a legacy of Americas colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to 1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial legacies (Americas empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between 1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored many of the pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view 1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of political competition have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986 see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies that have benefited elites and special interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional justice system.

However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has worked fairly well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights; regular, competitive elections for local and national offices; a system of checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and robust civil society. The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as well as economic integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines gross domestic product (GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics, governance, and the economy.

PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous commonwealth, the behavior of presidents and other powerful political and economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of the countrys democratic politics and governance.1 The Philippines is a unitary state with a winner-take-all electoral system, a presidency that exercises huge power over budgets and appointments, and congenitally weak political parties. As a result, the president plays a central role in determining policy outcomes, as well as the norms and behavior that shape politics and governance.

The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is the countrys remarkably resilient political and economic elite. The president is limited to a single six-year term, so the power and influence of individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business families such as the Marcoses, Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalasto name just a fewhave had noteworthy longevity and adaptability.2 They exert a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking, regulatory bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government resources.

For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong state by limiting the governments fiscal base and co-opting, corrupting, or intimidating the bureaucracy. It has stunted and distorted the Philippine economy, preferring collusion and protection over economic competition, and has been slow and selective in opening the economy to foreign competition. Because elites dominate legislative and policymaking processes, successive governments have failed to adopt and implement socioeconomic policies that address the needs of the poor and middle class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the Philippines has long been one of the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of poverty incidence among Asias developing economies. Even after more than a decade of relatively strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in 2015.3

Today, by the World Banks metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a per capita income of $3,600 and a consumption-driven economy that has been growing at about 6.5 percent per year for most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business process outsourcing sector.4 As a result, the countrys sizable, predominantly urban, middle class now comprises 15 to 20 percent of the population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century, the rich have become richer, the middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-quarter of the population remains poor.

THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT AND LIMITS OF REFORMISM The real change promised by Rodrigo Duterte has obscured how much positive change occurred under the administration of Benigno Aquino III (20102016).6 Aquinos promise to follow the straight path was an effort to both appropriate his mothers (Corazon Aquino) perceived integrity and draw a sharp contrast with the pervasive corruption associated with the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (20012010).7 Notable successes of the Aquino government included passing reproductive health and sin tax reform laws, implementing twelve years of basic education, extending public finance reform, expanding fiscal space and social spending, and making an effort to provide greater autonomy to Muslims in Mindanao. GDP growth reached 6.5 percent, and by virtually every measure the countrys international standing improved significantly. As a result, Aquino remained popular throughout most of his term.

To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes. Macroeconomic growth was slow to reduce poverty, and the government was unable to rapidly improve infrastructure, especially in traffic-clogged Metro Manila. It did little to reform dysfunctional food and agriculture policies, and could have done more to strengthen anticorruption institutions and to pass a freedom of information law. In terms of governance, Aquino was widely seen as honest, but he sometimes valued loyalty over competence and occasionally seemed to lack the empathy that Filipinos expect from their political leaders. His administration also suffered from complacency (due to the presidents personal popularity), problems communicating its accomplishments, and its failure to make the Liberal Party a more coherent and durable political party. And when it came time to choose a successor, Aquino remained committed to supporting Manuel Mar Roxas, his secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)even though opinion polls consistently indicated that Roxas would not win.8

DUTERTE AND THE PROMISE OF REAL CHANGE On May 10, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, then seventy-one years old, was elected president, winning 39 percent of the vote in a five-way race. Charismatic, blunt, and frequently profane, Duterte combined a Dirty Harry persona with a track record as a successful mayor of Davao City, Mindanaos largest city. Although Duterte might appear to be unsophisticated and crude, he is politically savvy and attuned to the attitudes and concerns of average Filipinos. He ran on his reputation as an effective, no-nonsense mayor of Davao who prioritized law and order over legal protections for alleged criminals. The overarching theme of Dutertes campaign was that his strong leadership would produce rapid change. During his campaign, he heaped criticism on the Manila-based elite, vowed to undertake a nationwide assault on illegal drugs and criminality, and promised to change the government to a federal system. His victory over Mar Roxas, who placed a distant second, signaled that the promise of change was more compelling than continuity. Even though Duterte had been popular in Mindanao before he ran for president, his victory showed that his appeal spanned regions and socioeconomic classes. The 16.6 million Filipinos who voted for him appeared to believe that he could deliver real change. Dutertes victory surprised many and shocked some. In the wake of his election, political analysts have grappled with what it says about contemporary Philippine politics. The reasons why he won are complex, suggesting that cautious and nuanced conclusions are warranted. First, the incumbent, Benigno Aquinothe embodiment of reformist elite democracycould not run for a second term. If he had been able to run, it might have been a very different outcome.9 Second, the Philippine election law has no provision for run-offs, so there is no incentive to form coalition tickets. Had Mar Roxas and Senator Grace Poe, the two most like-minded candidates, joined forces, they might have been able to defeat Duterte. Third, Duterte ran a savvy and effective campaign. He announced his candidacy late, so the media had little time to scrutinize his record as mayor and his rivals had much less chance to attack him. His campaign mobilized large numbers of volunteers and used social media well. Fourth, all four of Dutertes opponents had significant negatives. In contrast, Duterte, because of his personality and message, was an attention-grabbing and compelling candidate, who was able to tap into (and to some extent manipulate) middle class frustrations and latent anxiety, particularly about drugs and crime.10 Although the assertions of middle-class frustration seem valid for anyone who has lived in Metro Manila, Cebu, or the handful of other cities that are home to most of the Philippine middle class, the extent to which this sense of frustration and anxiety was national in scope is relatively less clear. THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENTS PRIORITIES AND POLICIES Upon assuming office on June 30, 2016, Duterte assembled an eclectic cabinet that included law school classmates, long-time associates from Davao, ex-military officers, business leaders, and representatives of the communist left. His diverse coalition came together through personal loyalty, regional affinity, and political opportunism. It included many political figures who had been sidelined during the Aquino administration, most notably former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and members of the Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families.

Now seventy-three years old, Dutertes world view is heavily influenced by nationalist and leftist thought dating from the 1960s and 1970s, as well as by his twenty-two years of experience as mayor of Davao City. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with socially progressive and pro-business policies. As mayor he was both a paternalistic patron and a fearsome boss whose orders had to be followed. As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or challenges to this authority. He sees the country as beset by existential threats of drugs, crime, and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his approach is highly personalistic: he presents himself as the only leader strong and decisive enough to save the nation. As for his frequently crude and threatening rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has called his approach crass politics that, though objectionable to many, communicates multiple messages: Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication when he prefaces his remarks with mother fucker, but he brings to the surface the collective frustration many feel. He may not offer the clearest policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of sympathy. . . . Dutertes gutter language establishes the urgency of saving the republic. Including kill and death is essential to the presidents vocabulary for the country is at war, and his politics of I will demands quick, albeit painful, solutions.11 KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES The Duterte governments top priorities include combating illegal drugs and crime, promoting rapid infrastructure development, sustaining economic growth and making it more inclusive, enhancing peace and development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines foreign relations. To support these goals, the government has significantly increased spending on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government employees, expanded existing social development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into negotiations with the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.

Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the governments domestic and foreign policies. Instead, the following sections discuss three policy areas that offer insights into the Duterte administrationeconomic policymaking, peace and development in Mindanao, and constitutional changeand discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs. Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed little interest in economic policy issues. To reassure nervous domestic and foreign businesses, his campaign developed a ten-point economic agenda that largely continued the Aquino governments economic policies. Since taking office, Dutertes two principal economic priorities have been to accelerate economic growth and make it more inclusive, and to significantly increase spending on much-needed infrastructure. Key features of the governments approach to the economy include running a larger deficit, adopting a more statist approach to infrastructure development, and continuing increases in social spending.