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3. Consider a duopoly in which two firms choose to advertise or not advertise. This interaction and the resulting profits are depicted by the game below. Firm 2 Advertise Don't Advertise 650 billion EO billion Advertise E50 billion E100 billion Firm 1 E100 billion E65 billion Don't Advertise 60 billion E65 billion Part (i): Identify the Nash Equilibrium of this game. Part (ii): Suppose that the firms form a cartel agreement with the sole objective of maximizing their combined profits. The firms are not colluding on the typical choice variables of price or quantity, but on their advertising strategies. Identify the cartel agreement strategies. Part (iii): Suppose that the firms adopt the cartel agreement that you identified in part (ii), and that each adopts the Grim Trigger Strategy. Identify the range of & over which the firms would uphold that cartel agreement. Explain this result. Part (iv): Suppose that the firms adopt the cartel agreement that you identified in part (ii), and that each adopts the Tit-for-Tat Trigger Strategy. Identify the range of o over which the firms would uphold that cartel agreement. Explain this result