please explain each question

Question '1 {1 point} Consider a synergistic relationship with two agents. Each player's action can be any non-negative number. Let a,- denote player i's action, i=1,2. Given actionsr player i's utility is, as before, tit-{51,62} = 3km1a2 [at-)3. Assume that #1 is commonly known. However. player 1 knows only that player 2's in: value can take one of two valuesr k; or kg! and he believes that each value is equally likely. Player 2 knows here k value. In other words, player 2 has two types. Let a; and n; denote player 2's action for each of the two types respectively. Derive player 1's best response function and select the correct answer below. Question 2 {'1 point} Find the NE of the synergistic relationship with imperfect information in which actions are strictly positive. What is player 1's equilibrium action? Select the correct answer below. 0\"; = 3'1 1'3 (small; +%[k3)1f2)'f' on: =kf=ls (ans 15f or = also 'r'= + ass) 's 1