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4. [8 points] Argy (A) and Bargy (B) are again bargaining over $100, but according to different rules (from those in the previous problem). Argy will now submit a pair of numbers (Xx, Y...) to a Judge, and Bargy will submit (X3, Y3). They must do so simultaneously and independently of each other. These numbers must be chosm from the set {0, 1, 2, ..., 100}, and they will be interpreted by the Judge as follows: Xi, is the amount that A offers to B if A is the proposer, and Y3 is the minimum amount that A will accept if A is the respondent X3 is the amount that B offers to A ifB is the proposer, and YB is the minimum amount that B will accept if B is the respondent. After receiving these submissions, the Judge rst randomly selects one of A or B to be the Proposer, each with probability '/2. The other person will be the Respondent. Then the Judge allocates the $100 as follows: Suppose the Proposer offers X and the Respondent will accept no less than Y. If X a Y, then the Respondent gets X and the Proposer gets 100 X. If K 0. Show that it is weakly dominated by another strategy. Which one? Justify your answer. Similarly, for player B any strategy (X3, Y3) with Ys 3' 0 is weakly dominated. (c) Identify the Nash Equilibrium that survives the Iterated Deletion of Weakty Dominated Strategies. Justify your