please provide explanations

3. Huawei must decide whether to enter a market where Samsung operates. If it chooses Not Enter, Huawei will have a payoff of 1.5 (million) while Samsung will have a payoff of 3 (million). If Huawei chooses Enter, then the two firms play a simultaneous game where Samsung chooses between a Hostile strategy and a Balanced strategy, while Samsung chooses between Accommo- dating or Fighting the new entrant. The payoffs (in millions) from this interaction is given by the following matrix: Samsung A F H (3, 0) Huawei (2, -1) B (0, -1) (4, 0) (i) Represent the entire game in extensive form (Draw a game tree). [6 Marks] (ii) Is this a game of perfect or imperfect information? [2 Marks] (iii) How many sub-games are there in this game? [2 Marks] (iv) How many information sets does each player have? [2 Marks] (v) Represent the whole as a normal form game (i.e. matrix) and find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. [6 Marks] (vi) Find all the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this game. Are the number of NE and SPNE different here - why /why not? [7 Marks]