Question 2 In this question, we'll consider a model with a risk-averse multi-tasking agent where the tasks have correlated noise. There is a principal and an agent. The agent performs two tasks, and chooses efforts el and e2. The agent's efforts generate noisy outputs: y1=e1+e and y2 =e2+ Where e is a common noise term with ]E[e] = 0 and Var[e] = 02 > 0. The principal can offer the agent an incentive scheme based on both task outputs: T= cx+b1y1+b2y2. The principal is risk-neutral while the agent is risk-averse: Tr: lE[y1+gy2t] and u=lE[r] gVarfr] %( +e22.). Note that the parameter 9 represents the importance of task 2 to the principal; it can be positive, negative, or zero. The timing is as usual: Step 1. The principal chooses the incentive scheme. Step 2. The agent decides whether to accept or reject the offer. (If he rejects, the game ends and he each receive outside option g = 0.) Step 3. The agent chooses el and e2. Step 4. Outputs yl and y2 are realized. The principal pays the agent 1'. Let's proceed step-bystep to solve the