solve this question properly.

5(A) Consider the three-player game shown below. Player 1 selects a row, either al, bl or cl. Player 2 selects a column, either a2 or b2. Player 3 selects a matrix, either a3 or b3. The first number in a cell is player 1's payoff, the second number is player 2's payoff, and the last number is player 3's payoff. Derive the strategies that survive the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. After IDSDS, does this game have Nash Equilibrium? Player-3: a3 Player-3: b3 Player-2 Player-2 a2 b2 a2 b2 al Player-1 9, 7, 6 8, 9, 7 Player-1 al 9, 7, 7 7, 9, 8 b1 6, 9, 7 7, 7, 6 b1 8, 6, 8 8, 8, 7 c1 7, 6, 8 7, 8, 7 c1 7, 7, 7 6, 8, 6 5(B) Find all the Nash equilibrium for the game below using best-reply method. (Do not use IDSDS). Player-3: I Player-3: II Player-2 Player-2 X Z X y Z a 8, 7, 8 6, 6, 8 7, 8,9 a 8, 7, 9 7, 6, 9 7, 6, 10 Player-1 b 6, 9, 7 8, 8, 10 9, 7, 6 Player-1 b 7, 8, 7 9, 9, 9 7, 7, 7 C 7, 7, 7 9, 8, 7 8, 8, 8 C 7, 8, 7 7, 6, 6 8, 7, 8