Submit your assignment 0 Help Q1 (20 points) Question 1: [20 minutes] Suppose a society consists of 3 people with the following preferences Voter 1: 29 >1 :9 >12, Voter 2: 2 >2 y %2 93, Voter 3: 1: >3 y >3 z. Now suppose these preferences are aggregated by a social welfare functional G that satises Weak Pareto (WP) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Without invoking Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, argue that the social welfare functional G cannot rank y at the top. In other words, it is not possible to have either G(>'19>'21>'3) : y >39 33' >S Z OI G(>1,>2,>3) : y >'S Z }S .T