Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity Price Total Revenue and Total Profit (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) (Dollars) 36 0 40 33 1,320 30 30 2,400 120 27 3,240 160 24 3,840 200 21 4,200 240 18 4,320 280 15 4,200 320 12 3,840 360 9 3.240 400 6 2,400 440 3 1,320 480 0 0 Refer to Table 17-1. If Celia and Venya operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, what price will they charge? O a. $12 O b. $15 O c. $21 O d. $18