Table $17-1$

Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table:

$\backslash$begin$\{$tabular$\}\{|$c$|$c$|$c$|\}$

$\backslash$hline Quantity & Price & $\backslash$begin$\{$tabular$\}\{$c$\}$

Total Revenue and Total $\backslash \backslash$

Profit $\backslash \backslash$

$($Dollars per $\backslash \backslash$

gallon$)$

$\backslash$end$\{$tabular$\}\backslash \backslash$

$($Dollars$)$

$\backslash$end$\{$tabular$\}$

Refer to Table $17-1.$ Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Celia and Venya from operating as a monopoly. How many gallons of water will be produced and sold once Celia and Venya reach a Nash equilibrium?

$240$

$320$

$280$

$360$