Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Diamond and Jake, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Diamond and Jake work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Diamond and Jake can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity (Gallons) Price (Dollars per gallon) Total Revenue and Total Profit (Dollars) 0 60 0 80 55 4,400 160 50 8,000 240 45 10,800 320 40 12,800 400 35 14,000 480 30 14,400 560 25 14,000 640 20 12,800 720 15 10,800 800 10 8,000 880 5 4,400 960 0 0 Refer to Table 17-1. If Diamond and Jake operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how much profit will each of them earn, assuming that the two producers split the market equally? $6,400 $7,200 $7,000 $14,400