This case is about Intercultural Management. Please read the case and answer the question below:

What synergies can GBS expect to create by raising company-wide awareness of the cultural issue? What leverage can GBS gain by acknowledging the reality of cultural differences? Justify your answer.

CASE DESCRIPTION The situation A large US-based global business services company (hereafter GBS) has nearly 60,000 employees in North America and operations in more than 100 countries. In 2011, GBS's total revenue exceeded $30 billion. Some ten years ago, GBS concluded that staying competitive in its industry required, among other things, outsourcing certain tasks to lower-cost locations overseas. While GBS considered several destinations, including Ireland and Mexico, the available labour pool was much larger in India, a key consideration given GBS's long-term master plan eventually to have as many as 15,000 offshore employees (a number it is now approaching in 2012). Moreover, the cost savings in India (at the time) were estimated to be 60%. Competitive pressures notwithstanding, the decision of this more than 125 -year-old company to move a significant percentage of its work (and its workforce) to a foreign country some 12,000 miles and more than nine time zones away occasioned a great deal of internal head-shaking, soulsearching, hand wringing - and resistance. The move offshore, in short, would have to be aggressively "sold" in the face of considerable skepticism and widespread anxiety. It may have been a financial "no brainer," but it would need to have considerably more momentum behind it. At the core of the selling strategy, not surprisingly, was an intensive effort to make the case that nothing is going to change, also known as the "you-won't-notice-any-difference" argument. The idea here was that sending certain tasks offshore, thereby creating the need for Americans to work closely with Indian colleagues half a world away, would not be any different than working with colleagues and direct reports just down the hall. But to make this case, GBS would have to address and somehow neutralize three common concerns: we won't understand them (the language issue); they're sleeping when we're working and vice versa (the time difference issue); and they don't think or work the way we do (the cultural issue). Another possible challenge - they don't know the GBS way of doing things - was a nonstarter, as a comprehensive 14-week orientation and training programme was developed for all new Indian hires. The language issue was not about Indians' ability to speak fluent English but whether or not Americans could understand the Indian accent. While this has turned out to be a lingering concern, it has not proven to be a deal-breaker, largely because most Americans, after some initial frustration and confusion, have become used to the Indian accent. The time difference was most commonly addressed by scheduling three daily shifts so that staff was always available during US working hours. The time difference was, in fact an advantage in those cases where the Americans could assign tasks at the end of the US workday and the Indians would complete the work overnight. The third concern, the cultural issue, was not addressed but, rather, ultimately dismissed. This may sound odd on the surface - surely cultural differences would influence the US-India work relationships - but it is somewhat common that both parties in an offshore venture tend to underestimate the role of culture. While there is no doubt a self-serving motive at work here - it is in neither side's interest, after all, to suggest that working with Indians is any different from working with Americans - there are at least two other factors that come into play. One is the common Indian sentiment that having worked with Westerners before, perhaps having worked only with Western clients or partners, Indians are very familiar with Western culture and easily adapt. The other related factor is that while both sides accept that there may be cultural differences, they consider them to be minor and, more importantly, they are far outweighed by the similarities. The differences are superficial, this logic holds, whereas the similarities are profound. Whatever the explanation, GBS's senior management was either persuaded or persuaded itself that culture was not going to be a problem. While this was certainly convenient and completely consistent with GBS's "you-won't-notice-any-difference" theme, it does appear in retrospect that GBS came by this sentiment honestly, that there was not in fact, any attempt on either side (India or the US) to deliberately minimize or ignore possible cultural differences, tempting as that might have been. Culture was discussed in headquarters, although not with any cultural experts, and GBS concluded it would not cause any significant problems. In short, there was not a cultural "issue". Work in India began with some trials, mostly in the tax division of GBS, lasting between three and six months. The results validated many aspects of the offshore model, and with some adjustments of other features, the company began to expand what came to be known as GBS India. The challenge Some 18 months into the experience, three major recurring challenges were still not responding to any of the traditional fixes. Americans complained that: 1. Indians fall behind on their work, but they don't tell us and then they miss their deadlines 2. Indians say they understand something when in fact, they do not, and as a result, much of their work has to be redone. 3. Indians don't tell us when they think something we have asked for is impossible, won't work, or when they know a better way of doing it; they don't give honest feedback. Initially, GBS responded with the standard expectations-setting approach: bring the parties involved together, describe the disconnects, layout and get agreement on expectations going forward, and then wait for the necessary behaviour changes to start showing up. But when Indians were made aware of the three complaints, they responded as follows: 1. "We always tell you when we fall behind, but you don't seem to understand and are surprised when we need more time." "We remind you of the deadline; we ask you if a given date is still the deadline; we mention we are working overtime and even coming in at weekends; we send an unsolicited update that does not specifically state we are behind but shows where we are on the timeline (which is not where we need to be if we are still on schedule). We assume you Americans are reading these messages correctly (since you do not say you don't understand), and you have postponed the deadline. But you Americans just don't get it." 2. "You don't give us very much guidance, so we have to try to guess what you're looking for, and sometimes we guess wrong." "We can't tell you that we do not understand something you have explained because this could embarrass you by implying you did not give a very good explanation." "When you ask us the question, we probably would casually say 'yes' and then fully expect you to follow up, checking in regularly to see if we had any questions. When you do not follow up, in effect, taking 'yes' for an answer, we are forced to work on our own rather than approach you, which would embarrass you by asking for further explanations." "We would like you proactively to offer guidance and tell us what to do." 3. "We give honest feedback, but sometimes you don't listen." "We can't possibly say anything negative to you. What we can do is not say anything positive or not say anything at all. Just not saying anything doesn't mean we agree or approve of what you say." Since the whole subject of culture and cultural differences had been taken off the agenda at the beginning of the offshore experiment, GBS had to find other, more conventional explanations for what was happening. In the case of the three complaints, the causes had to be located elsewhere, with one or more of the "usual suspects": the wrong skillset, incompetence, not enough experience, or, simply, individual staff members who were just "difficult". And the solutions, likewise, had to fit these standard explanations: tighten the job qualifications, improve the interview and selection protocols, do more targeted training, and replace difficult people. In the end, because GBS had turned a blind eye to culture, it never identified the true causes of the three problems, and its "solutions", of course, had little or no effect. For two years, nothing happened - nothing, that is, except for growing frustration and discontent inside GBS with all things offshore, undermining the entire strategy and jeopardizing ambitious expansion plans. In the end, the impasse forced GBS to re-examine its "you-won't-notice anydifference" strategy and to engage the services of an outside cultural consultant who had worked with numerous American and Indian companies. The consultant was charged with determining whether cultural differences disrupted the working relations between US and Indian colleagues. When the consultant found that cultural differences were at the heart of the three complaints described earlier, senior leadership at GBS was obliged to acknowledge that culture was an "issue" and devise a strategy to address its impact