We have studied the 2-period alternating offer bargaining model with constant costs of delay. In other words, in that model, there were two agents 1 and 2 , each with a constant delay cost c1 and c2 respectively. That is the cost to each player i of each period of delay is ci . Now consider the 3 -period version of the model. In this model there are 3 periods t = 0, 1, 2 . As before the cost of each additional period of delay is ci to player i, i.e., if the period t = 2 proposal z = (z1, z2) is accepted then player i’s payoff is zi − 2ci and if the period t = 2 proposal is rejected, then it is (−2c1, −2c2). Assume c1 > c2. Find a SPE of the game?

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Answer In game theory a subgame perfect equilibrium or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium ... View the full answer