a. The game to the right is an example of Chicken where T>R> P>S. Consider the...

 

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a. The game to the right is an example of Chicken where T>R> P>S. Consider the following tit-for-tat strategy TFT = Betsy Susan→ Acquiesce (A) Insist (1) start with A; play whatever your opponent did in the previous period A R, R T, P I P, T S, S Consider a repeated version of this game, where the ending period is finite, but unknown. Under what condition is (TFT, TFT) a Nash equilibrium? b. Is (TFT, TFT) a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)? Note: no illustrations are necessary to justify your answer but you do need to consider potentialities where TFT is paired with some strategy other than TFT. a. The game to the right is an example of Chicken where T>R> P>S. Consider the following tit-for-tat strategy TFT = Betsy Susan→ Acquiesce (A) Insist (1) start with A; play whatever your opponent did in the previous period A R, R T, P I P, T S, S Consider a repeated version of this game, where the ending period is finite, but unknown. Under what condition is (TFT, TFT) a Nash equilibrium? b. Is (TFT, TFT) a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)? Note: no illustrations are necessary to justify your answer but you do need to consider potentialities where TFT is paired with some strategy other than TFT.

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A Nash equilibrium in a repeated version of this game is defined as a pair of strategies such that each players strategy is their best response given the other players strategy For TFT TFT to be a Nas... View the full answer