Question 2 In this question, we'll consider a model with a risk-averse multi-tasking agent where the tasks have correlated noise. There is a principal and an agent. The agent performs two tasks, and chooses efforts 21 and 22. The a) I\" Step 3' What is the agent's optimal choice ofel and 52' as a function 0f bl and [72? agents elforts generate nOisy outputs: 2 Suppose g : 0, so task2 doesn't matter for the principal at all. What is the principal's optimal , a: as? . . v; as? y] = e] + a and }'2 = 82 + e chOice ofb1 and b2 . What are the corresponding effort choices (21 and 22 . where E is a common noise term with EM : 0 and Var[] : 02 > 0_ Still supposing g : 0, what are the efficient effort choices eifand egfthat a social planner , , . 4 maximiz-ing 71+Ll would impose? You should find that 61'